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1. INTRODUCTION
On June 11th 2008 another outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza (H5N1) 
was reported in Hong Kong – the site of the first reported human deaths from this 
virus in 1997. Media reports portrayed the possibility of a major catastrophe. Anxious 
citizens stopped eating chicken. With China hosting the Olympics in a matter of 
weeks, concerns were raised in the highest circles about the consequences of an 
outbreak – for world profile and for business. Politicians wanted firm action. On 
June 20th, officials proposed a package of US$128 million to put the small-scale 
poultry sector and wet markets out of business. Traders have rejected the proposal, 
and many consumers argue that the alternative frozen supermarket chickens are 
not what they want. Others argue that attempts at regulating imports and banning 
wet markets are futile. Informal, unregulated trade abounds, and with South China 
being a known, if poorly reported, hot spot of avian influenza virus circulation, the 
chances of keeping Hong Kong free of the disease are very small indeed. Yet, 
sceptics argue that the proposed measures are more about political grandstanding 
and public relations than sensible, science-based control policies. They argue that 
the net consequences for farmers’, traders’ and poorer consumers’ livelihoods 
will be negative, with only the well-connected large suppliers and supermarkets 
benefiting. But, given the fears around viral mutation into a form capable of efficient 
human-to-human transmission, others conclude that precaution, even if drastic, is 
the most appropriate route1. 
This example highlights the complex trade-offs involved in policy processes around 
avian influenza. These are intensely political, pitting different interests and groups 
of actors against each other. Public image, business interests and poor people’s 
livelihoods are all involved in a complex mix. And the science often is so uncertain 
that firm decisions based on exact predictions and precise measures are impossible. 
Judgements – normally political judgements – are made, and these are necessarily 
highly contextual. Media pressure, political effectiveness, implementation capacity 
and geopolitical positioning all come into the picture. 
Thus, in order to understand the politics of the international policy response to 
avian influenza, we must explore an intersecting story of virus genetics, ecology 
and epidemiology with economic, political and policy machinations in a variety of 
places – from Hong Kong to Washington, to Jakarta, Cairo, Rome and London. 
This paper offers one, necessarily partial and incomplete, view of the story over 
1 Economist June 28 2008, http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_
id=11622415; see http://www.info.gov.hk/info/flu/eng/index.htm
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the last decade – and particularly the last few years when over $2 billion of public 
funds have been mobilised. It is a fascinating and important story. It is important 
because the HPAI story is seen by many as a ‘dress rehearsal’ for a major pandemic 
emerging from a zoonotic disease, whereby a combination of viral genetic change 
and ecological circumstance results in transmission of a new disease among 
humans, with devastating consequences. The 1918 human influenza pandemic 
killed at least 50 - 100 million people globally2. Estimates for future pandemics vary 
widely, but a simple calculation sees three times that number given the world’s 
increased population3. And we are of course in the midst of the catastrophic 
pandemic of HIV/AIDS which had its origins as a zoonosis, and which, for a range 
of reasons, was not spotted early enough and spread widely. Between 1940 and 
2004 over 300 new infectious diseases emerged, some 60 per cent of which were 
zoonoses from animals4. That a pandemic influenza strain has not yet emerged 
from the H5N1 virus currently circulating, at least at the time of writing this paper, 
is no reason for complacency. An influenza pandemic will happen, it is argued 
convincingly - some time, somewhere - and we had better be ready for it. For this 
reason, exploring the successes and failures of the avian influenza response to 
date is an important task. 
The avian influenza response story is fascinating because it offers insights into some 
wider dilemmas surrounding animal health, production and trade, public health, 
emergency responses and long-term development, and the global governance of 
all of these. As with many high-profile policy debates, there are multiple, competing 
policy formulae and diverse, sometimes conflicting, intervention responses. There 
are a vast range of actors, associated with numerous networks, often cutting 
across sectoral boundaries, public/private divides and local, national and global 
settings. Avian influenza has caused a massive mobilisation of public funds, 
involving numerous agencies and resulting in countless initiatives, programmes 
and projects. Yet there has been often remarkable collaboration across what had 
previously been deep organisational and professional divides. There has also been 
a range of organisational innovation and experimentation. These offer important 
insights into what to do – and indeed what not to do – in the future. 
In other words, the avian influenza response offers some important perspectives 
on some of the ‘big issues’ of the moment. These include, for example, how to 
respond to uncertain threats which have transnational implications; how to cut 
across the emergency-development divide, making sure crises result in longer 
term responses as well as dealing with immediate needs; how to balance interests 
and priorities between ensuring health and safety as well as livelihoods; how to 
operate effectively in a complex multilateral system, within and beyond the UN; 
what a commitment to ‘security’ in health and livelihoods really means in practice; 
and much, much more. 
These are of course all massive, and highly contentious, issues, and this paper will 
not provide any neat and tidy answers. What it aims to do instead is, through an 
analytical lens which looks at the politics of policy processes, shed light on these 
issues, sharpening the questions raised and the trade-offs implied. As the global 
avian influenza response moves towards a bigger, overarching ‘One World, One 
Health’ agenda, focusing on the intersections of animal, human and ecosystem 
health proposed at the December 2007 Delhi inter-ministerial meeting5 and being 
elaborated for the 2008 Sharm El-Sheikh international ministerial conference, 
these issues become even more pertinent. We are interested in asking: given the 
lessons of the international response to date, what should be the features of an 
effective, equitable and resilient response infrastructure at the international level? 
In essence, what should a ‘One World, One Health’ initiative look like in practice?
2. THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE: 1997-2008
There has now been more than a decade of experience since the Hong Kong avian 
influenza H5N1 outbreak of 1997 when 18 people were infected and six died. Since 
2003 245 people are reported to have died from infection with this virus across the 
world, with mortalities highly concentrated in a few countries, mostly in South East 
Asia6. The avian virus has spread across most of Asia and Europe, with regular, 
usually seasonally-defined, outbreaks in poultry. In some countries – and the list 
varies, but always includes Indonesia, China and Egypt – the disease has become 
endemic among bird populations. In response to these outbreaks over two billion 
poultry have been culled, affecting the livelihoods and businesses of millions7. 
Thus, while a major human pandemic has thankfully not occurred, the disease and 
the consequences of the resulting policy interventions have been far reaching and, 
in certain contexts for certain people, dramatic. Figure 1 offers a map of the spread 
of the virus across the world.
2 Johnson and Müller (2002). As the iconic event of the past century, around which much media and 
policy discussion has centred, the 1918 pandemic has been the subject of intense research, ranging 
from social histories to technical assessments (cf. Morens and Facui 2007; Taubenberger and 
Morens, 2006; Taubenberger et al 2005).
3 Murray et al (2007) offer a more sophisticated analysis.
4 See, for example: Woolhouse 2008; Jones et al, 2008; Webster et al 2007; Woolhouse and 
Gaunt 2007; Woolhouse and Gowtage-Sequeria 2005; Woolhouse et al, 2006; Webster 2002.
5 See Wildlife Conservation Society 2004, http://www.wcs.org/sw-high_tech_tools/
wildlifehealthscience/owoh  for an early exposition of the ‘One World, One Health’ concept. See 
also http://www.oneworldonehealth.org/  and http://www.wcs.org/5060651 for details of the 
‘Manhattan Principles’.
6 For date to 10 September 2008, see: http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/country/
cases_table_2008_09_10/en/index.html. For useful reviews, see MacKellar (2007) and Parry (2007). 
7 World Bank (2005); (2005a); McKibben and Sidorenko (2006).
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The H5N1 avian influenza virus has thus had a substantial impact. How then has 
a miniscule virus, made up of a few strands of RNA and a protein coating which 
might, or might not, have a devastating impact on human populations, influenced 
policy and practice globally? Appendix 1 shows two timelines stretching over the 
period since 1997, with a number of key moments identified. 
Biological, economic and policy processes are mutually intertwined, co-constructing 
the response. Epidemiological processes of spread – through wild birds, trade or 
poor market hygiene – are influenced by policies which result in mass culls of 
poultry, banning wet markets, or imposing import regulations. In different settings 
these measures may restrict spread – or actually increase it, as they drive activities 
underground. What has happened in practice is highly dependent on the way 
different contexts affect this interplay between biology, economic interests and 
policy. In some parts of the world – notably in Europe, but also in Thailand, Hong 
Kong, and, for a time, Vietnam – policies have influenced disease incidence 
and spread in ways that have seen intermittent outbreaks being controlled and 
managed increasingly effectively. In other places, this has not been the case, 
and the disease has become endemic, with regular outbreaks occurring, and little 
likelihood of eliminating the virus8. In terms of the global policy response, it is the 
former context – of controlled virus and stamping out of intermittent outbreaks – 
that has dominated thinking and practice, while the latter context – of an endemic 
disease situation – has been largely ignored – or denied. 
As figure 2 highlights, concerns in many quarters rose as the disease spread from 
isolated outbreaks in South East Asia – first to central Asia, then to Europe and 
Africa. The speech by US President George Bush in September 2005 to the United 
Nations indicated strongly that the US was taking this very seriously9. In the post 
9/11 world where threats to US homeland security could arise from terrorism and 
infectious disease – and potentially deadly combinations of the two – the spectre of 
a major pandemic rang alarm bells. As a US government official put it. 
Figure 1. Confirmed occurrence of H5N1 in poultry and wild birds since 2003
In the wake of 9/11 scenario and the transformation of the institutional response 
capability within the US, we were looking at a sort of all hazards approach, and how 
the White House sees that with homeland security, it was kind of natural to see this 
potential threat in a broader context and to respond to it in a fairly robust manner… 
Also the sensitivity to criticism that came out of Katrina lent the whole White House 
focus a sharp edge. We don’t want to be criticised like that again so we really need 
to do a good job on this… It is one of our high priorities because this is a presidential 
initiative and the president has an interest in what is going on…there’s the White 
House, the Homeland Security Council, that’s a sort of national security council, and 
they’ve had the primary lead, and it’s a real lead. If something happens it’s homeland 
security. It’s very much in a security framework10.
8 Food and Agriculture Organisation (2007a); Sims (2007).
9 http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/20050914.html
10 Interview, Washington DC, 11 June 2008.
Figure 2. The international avian influenza response: an actor-network diagram
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An unforgiving electorate, an anxious population and a media that fed off ever more 
terrifying disaster scenarios was a potent mix. The UN was concerned too. What 
would happen if an influenza pandemic really did occur? How would national and 
international systems cope – and how would the UN respond? Across Asia, Europe 
and the US there was very real concern: “Governments thought a pandemic 
was around the corner. Really, ASEAN heads of government were particularly 
concerned”12. Concerns were also being raised by country officials, as well as 
UN, World Bank and other agency staff based particularly in south-east Asia. This 
provoked high level discussions among the Deputy UN Secretary General and the 
then Secretary General, and David Nabarro was appointed ‘UN System Influenza 
Coordinator’ in September 2005. Estimates of huge potential mortalities made at 
the time of his appointment provoked a major furore among the technical agencies, 
but it certainly resulted in the raising of the profile of the issue among a wider 
constituency, moving the debate from concerns at the ‘periphery’ right to the centre 
of the global system13. This was accelerated by the arrival of H5N1 in Europe and 
human cases in Turkey in January 2006. The possibility of a major pandemic looked 
to be potentially just around the corner. 
But there was not one single political motivation for action. Different pressures and 
influences arose on different sides of the Atlantic. In the US, as already mentioned, 
the ‘homeland security’ and ‘bioterror’ angle was critical. But so was, according 
to some, lobbying from pharmaceutical business interests, keen to create new 
market opportunities from the avian influenza crisis. This dynamic took a different 
complexion in Europe, however. As one informant argued:
11 Interview, Washington DC, 11 June 2008.
12 David Nabarro, review comment, August 2008.
13 Bird Flu ‘Could Kill 150m People.’  BBC Online 30 September 2005 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/
world/asia-pacific/4292426.stm
The EU, of course, sees harmonisation among member states as key. While market 
drivers are there, the pharma industry in Europe is more established, stable. They 
are worried about the politics of the Union: the two-speed Europe. Avian influenza 
was a very useful basis for mending political fences – dealing with the aberrations of 
a two-track Europe. Fake urgency helped bring things together. It helped push the 
political process forward14.
So, while policy narratives were being constructed in the context of ‘big politics’, 
this intersected with more technical debates. In 2005 a series of models were 
produced which showed the potential of spread from isolated outbreaks, and the 
importance of control and containment measures of various sorts (Longini et al 
2005; Ferguson et al 2005). At the same time scientific assessments of the H5N1 
virus showed its variability and the potential for rapid change. While couched in 
cautions and provisos, these emerging findings provided further impetus towards a 
concerted response. Business interests got in the act too. The anti-viral oseltamivir 
(Hoffmann-La Roche’s Tamiflu) was presented as an important stop-gap measure, 
reducing the impact of the virus in infected individuals. Governments quickly 
ordered stockpiles and the public sought supplies from any source15. Meanwhile 
vaccine manufacturers went in search of an elusive vaccine solution – one that 
would deal with seasonal influenzas as well as potential pandemic strains, at least 
until a more targeted one could be developed16. 
In 2005 the new International Health Regulations were published in response to 
the crisis17. These allowed for direct intervention at source in response to globally 
threatening disease situations. They also required a more streamlined and 
effective reporting system, building on the successful response following the SARS 
outbreaks of 2002-03. As discussed in more depth below, the IHR 2005 signalled 
an important shift in the international governance of public health issues, with a 
ceding of national sovereignty, at least in theory, in the face of a global threat (cf. 
Heymann 2006). 
The Beijing inter-ministerial pledging conference, held in January 2006, provided 
a focus for the growing global effort. US$1.8 billion were pledged, and the main 
technical agencies – the UN World Health Organisation (WHO), the UN Food and 
Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and the Office International des Epizooties (OIE) 
14 Interview, Geneva, 5 March 2008.
15 http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2005/oct/20/birdflu
16 see Stöhr and Esveld (2004).
17 Fidler (2005b).
18 One plan (A Global Strategy for the Progressive Control of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza, 
2005, later revised 2007) focuses on the animal health aspects and was led by FAO and OIE, 
with inputs from WHO, see: Food and Agriculture Organisation and Organisation International des 
Epizooties (2005); Food and Agriculture Organisation (2007b). Another from WHO (Responding to 
the Avian Influenza Pandemic Threat: Recommended Strategic Actions) focuses on public health 
aspects, see: http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/influenza/WHO_CDS_CSR_GIP_05_
8-EN.pdf, which is currently under revision.
Another continued:
Now if you are looking at what motivated this I would say it is not a lot of dead 
chickens. It’s fear of a lot of things. There is no question that the high level of interest 
at the highest level of government took place because of the fear of a 1918 style 
epidemic. And I’ve been at meetings in the White House where it was said that the 
scenario of 1918 was not necessarily the worst case - mortality, morbidity and so on. 
So what drove this? I think we just have to be frank – it is the fear of a severe human 
pandemic…. No matter how much we prepare there are huge concerns out there 
and electorates can be very unforgiving…. There are limits to how much you can do 
to prevent these kinds of things from happening. The limits changed for us on 9/11. 
Now we are a lot more concerned about terrorism, but you could argue that it still is 
not enough if you want to have perfect security. It’s the same with preparing for a 
pandemic. You can always put more in. But governments have to make decisions, 
they have to manage risks, and I think this is a risk that the US government, possibly 
more than any other government, has accentuated to the world. This is a serious risk 
we have to prepare for11.
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– came up with a series of plans and strategies prepared for the conference18. 
Whilst the issue had been live before, it was at this point that the ambitions and 
activities of the international response significantly scaled up. This has taken many 
forms in different places.
Much of the core work has focused on the veterinary response, controlling 
‘at source’ with the aim of both reducing socio-economic impacts on poultry 
production as well as reducing human exposure. As veterinarians argued, dealing 
with avian influenza was not new. They had standard approaches to controlling 
disease outbreaks which had been tried and tested over many years. What they 
needed now was more support for doing what they knew how to do already. Thus, 
as discussed below, standard culling, compensation, vaccination and market 
restructuring programmes were initiated in line with OIE and FAO guidelines. On 
the human public health side, programmes focused on drug and vaccine supply 
and delivery were combined with large scale public education and communication 
programmes to reduce infection and transmission risks, led by WHO and UNICEF, 
together with a range of NGOs19. In addition, human pandemic preparedness plans 
were developed across the world, with 109 country plans completed (if not tested) 
by the end of 200720. In different sectors and across agencies, scenarios were 
developed and contingency plans were tested, with UN agencies – UNOCHA (now 
incorporating PIC) and WFP in particular – often taking the lead.  
In sum, there has been a huge amount of activity, and considerable expenditure 
of resources – totalling way beyond the formal pledged commitments if the wider 
costs incurred by private companies and industry groups are included in the totals. 
This has involved large numbers of people, spread across diverse organisations 
in all parts of the world. What can we learn from all this? This paper does not 
aim to offer a detailed description of what, where and when, but to probe into the 
underlying rationales and drivers of different policies and actions. Understanding 
the policy process involves asking a series of interrelated questions (cf. Keeley and 
Scoones 2003): 
19 World Health Organization (2005) (2006) (2007).
20 http://www.un-pic.org/PIC/pages/report_overall.aspx
21 Policy narratives are stories told in policy debates. They have clear beginnings (defining the 
problem), middles (expanding on the context and challenges) and ends (elaboration of solutions). 
u First, what are the narratives – the storylines21 – which define the way the disease 
problem is understood and the way the response has unfolded? In other words, 
how are both problems and solutions framed, and through what mechanisms?
u Second, who are the actors involved in these narratives and how are they linked? How 
do they align – or not – with the main policy narratives being promoted? And how do 
they align with different interests – professional, organisational, political, commercial? 
3. ACTORS, NETWORKS AND NARATIVES: 
UNPACKING THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
The international response has been dominated by what might be termed an 
overarching ‘outbreak narrative’ (cf. Wald 2008). This has a number of recurrent 
features which, in turn, create a particular style of policy and politics. A central 
feature is public fear and worry which permeates public and media debates. This 
often involves the construction of ‘the other’ – dangerous places and people 
from where diseases come from, and something to be feared. Another feature of 
outbreak narratives focuses on western anxieties about globalisation – that we are 
all connected, and can all be affected, by diseases or other disasters that spread 
across the globe. In addition, there is often an assumption that outbreaks emerge 
from disrupted, primordial settings which are pushed ‘out of equilibrium’. This is 
linked to concerns about protecting the conditions of modernity, where disease is 
controlled, unlike in the primitive, backward, unregulated contexts where diseases 
emerge. Cutting through all of this is a politics of control and enforcement by the 
state – or global bodies with state-like characteristics – that at once constructs 
and justifies imposition and authority – by authorised, sanctioned expertise or, 
at the extreme, military-style force. All of these features of ‘outbreak narratives’ 
(Wald 2008) are present in the avian influenza experience. Understanding how 
these ways of thinking, talking and presenting ideas in public, academic and policy 
discourse is essential to unravelling how particular policy processes in particular 
places emerge.
 
In today’s world, of course, the media – in all its forms – has a major role to play 
in constructing these biopolitics22, and so framing the narratives and practices of 
response.  At the peak of the HPAI crisis, the global media had a field day23. Feeding 
u Third, in this process and over time, what policy spaces open up – and what 
spaces are closed down? What moments of debate, dispute and dissent exist – 
over what and between whom? And how do these spaces (or lack of them) affect 
what can be done?
u Finally, overall, we want to ask who wins and who loses through these processes? 
Whose version wins out, whose gets excluded, and why? And what other narratives, 
actors and interests exist with different perspectives, and how might these have 
influence in framing a future One World, One Health initiative?
22 Following Foucault, biopower involves the application and impact of power on human life and 
the body, with biopolitics being the intersection of politics and the life sciences (Rose 2006), see: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biopolitics
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on a climate of fear, anxiety and uncertainty in the post 9/11 world, journalists 
could construct some dire storylines. These were replete with disaster metaphors, 
conjuring up a politics of fear and blame. In tracing this process up to mid 2005, 
Nerlich and Halliday (2007) identify an article on human-human transmission in the 
New England Journal of Medicine in January 2005 as a key trigger (Ungchusak 
et al 2005). This was accompanied by an editorial by Klaus Stöhr (2005), then 
Coordinator of the Global Influenza Programme of the WHO, that was picked 
up by the New Scientist and the British Medical Journal the same week. These 
narratives of fear were of course reinforced by the speculative predictions and 
projections about potential mortalities, and the doomsday picture painted of 
collapsed economies, dying millions and a very personal, individual struggle to get 
hold of vaccines, drugs or safety equipment. So for example from around the time 
of Nabarro’s September 2005 appointment the following are a small sample of the 
top headlines, all in reputable publications:
‘On a wing and a prayer’: Millions of people killed in highly developed countries within 
months. Tens of millions worldwide. The global economy in tatters. A Hollywood 
fantasy? No – it’s now a plausible scenario. The first act, the spread of avian flu 
to, and probably between, humans, has already started across Asia. Unless the 
international community now moves decisively to mitigate this pandemic threat, we 
will in all probability pay heavily within a few years. Then, hard questions will be asked 
as to why we were not prepared24.
‘Bird flu ‘could kill 150m people: Experts fear birds will carry the virus across borders’. 
A flu pandemic could happen at any time and kill between 5-150 million people, a 
UN health official has warned. David Nabarro, who is charged with co-ordinating 
responses to bird flu, said a mutation of the virus affecting Asia could trigger new 
outbreaks. “It’s like a combination of global warming and HIV/Aids 10 times faster 
than it’s running at the moment,” Dr Nabarro told the BBC25. 
‘Bush seeks military option on bird flu’: President Bush, stirring debate on the 
worrisome possibility of a bird flu pandemic, suggested dispatching American troops 
to enforce quarantines in any areas with outbreaks of the killer virus. Bush asserted 
aggressive action could be needed to prevent a potentially crippling US outbreak 
of a bird flu strain that is sweeping through Asian poultry and causing specialists to 
fear it could become the next deadly pandemic. Citing concern that state and local 
authorities might be unable to contain such an outbreak, Bush asked Congress to 
give him the authority to call in the military26.
This only touches the surface. The blogosphere and the Internet discussion sites 
offer another whole dimension. Here conspiracy theories and dire scenarios abound 
– and feed off each other, in a frenzy of outbreak narratives of many sorts27. 
While of course it is impossible to attribute cause and effect in complex policy 
processes, many people commented to us that the media, and popular books on 
the subject, have had an impact on the framing of the policy debate. US President 
George Bush had reputedly been influenced by the book ‘The Great Influenza: 
The Story of the Deadliest Pandemic in History’ by John Barry, while another well-
read popular book, ‘The Coming Plague’ by Laurie Garrett, together with pieces 
in National Geographic, Newsweek and Time magazine, added to the deluge 
of commentary. In science-policy circles the coordinated publication of special 
issues by Foreign Affairs and Nature in 2005 added to the waves of interest and 
concern. A Foreign Affairs comment piece by Michael Osterholm, director of the 
Center for Infectious Disease Policy and Research at the University of Minnesota, 
was particularly well read (Osterholm 2005a)28. That the technical debate in the 
scientific journals of Cell, Science or Nature offered a more circumspect, uncertain 
and confused story, with highly conflicting models and predictions, did not really 
matter too much29. Headlines matter and policies almost necessarily have to follow 
a simple narrative storyline – beginning, middle, end; if this is the problem, then 
this is the solution. News coverage, and so political profile, does matter, across 
the spectrum of actors involved in the avian influenza response. The technical 
agencies are not immune. While they argue that it is only the science that justifies 
their position, the fact that an issue on their patch is in the media spotlight has 
consequences for profile, exposure and, ultimately, funding.  
23 For example, a timeline search of the Google News archive reveals the patterns of press 
interest since January 2004.
24 Nature 435, 385-386 26 May 2005 http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v435/n7041/pdf/
435385a.pdf 
25 BBC ONLINE: Friday, 30 September 2005 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-
pacific/4292426.stm
26 The Boston Globe: By Jennifer Loven, Associated Press, October 5, 2005.
27 Here is a sample from the blogosphere: “We are playing musical chairs. 300 million people and 
3 million chairs”, quote by NS1; “Attempting to prepare the US for a pandemic by making specific 
recommendations for the government to implement is like trying to cure anaemia by bleeding the 
patient. The cure for what ails this culture is more self-reliance; we aren’t going to get there by 
having the government do things we ought to do for ourselves”, quote by LMWatBullRun; “It will 
take more than ‘good men’ to get us out of this JIT jam. Those good men at the top must also 
be courageous, smart, informed, and lucky. We face the two most formidable opponents in all 
of recorded history - an urbanized human race with all of its current psycho-social weaknesses 
and a developing panflu that more than likely will sputter to life with breadth and depth”, quote 
by Medical Maven; “Fail to plan = plan to fail. Each of us to some extent is planning for the 
pandemic, but BROTHER are most of the rest planning to fail! Folks have talked about calling 
this the “Black Flu” or the “China Flu” or the “Boyd Flu”. I may start talking about the “Ellie Flu” 
after ‘Deep Impact’, y’know where they’re talking about ELE- Extinction Level Event...Maybe it 
would more accurately be the CEE flu - Civilization Ending Event”, quote by LMWatBullRun. All 
from PANDEMIC FLU INFORMATION FORUM -http://www.singtomeohmuse.com/index.php. See 
other blog and wiki sites, some more measured than others: www.fluwikie.com/index.php; http://
afludiary.blogspot.com/; http://birdflujourney.typepad.com/; http://crofsblogs.typepad.com/h5n1/; 
http://www.planforpandemic.com/.
28 See also Garrett (2005) and the follow-up issue (Osterholm 2007; Garrett 2007).
29 Yamada et al (2008).
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u First, a strong narrative linking veterinary concerns with agriculture and livelihood 
issues: “it’s a bird disease – and affects people’s livelihoods”. The responses have 
centred on veterinary control measures and industry ‘restructuring’, with the OIE 
and FAO being at the centre of the actor-network.
u Second, a human public health narrative which certainly dominated the media 
and political concerns: “human-human spread is the real risk, and could be 
catastrophic”. Here a combination of drugs, vaccines and behaviour change were 
seen to dominate the response, one very much centred on the WHO, with UNICEF 
and a number of NGOs being important players too.
u Third, a narrative focused on pandemic preparedness: “a major economic and 
humanitarian disaster is around the corner and we must be prepared”. Responses 
focus on civil contingency planning, business continuity approaches and 
containment strategies. Here, a much wider network of business/industry players 
and consultants are concerned, linked to different branches of government, notably 
prime ministers’/presidents’ offices and finance ministries with concerns about the 
fallout of any pandemic. The humanitarian community – UN agencies, the Red 
Cross, development NGOs and others – are also important.
Such narratives compete for attention in the policy process. One informant put it 
succinctly: “We’ve got David Nabarro drawing a picture of a spectre that is going to 
engulf the world, and you’ve got vets saying ‘you can say anything you like, but it is 
about chickens”30 . Figure 2 offers a diagrammatic interpretation of the constellation 
of actors involved in the international response. Clearly there are more actors than 
this, especially those only tangentially engaged, but this diagram is our attempt 
to map out the actor network based on the extensive interviews undertaken. Our 
study has primarily focused on the international public response and so underplays 
the array of actors and interactions within the private sector.
In subsequent sections each of these actors and their associated networks will 
be introduced. At this broader level, however, the diagram offers an insight into a 
number of important features, pertinent to our broader analysis:
u Actors coalesce around the three core outbreak narratives described above. These 
are distinct actor networks, associated with some lead agencies and key people. But 
they are not wholly separate: they come together in a number of important bridging 
In different ways, then, an outbreak narrative dominated across a range of actors 
and networks. In the context of the avian influenza response, not just one outbreak 
narrative, but three were important. Each is associated with a particular grouping 
of people, professions and processes. In the next sections of this paper we look at 
the following trio:
30 Interview, Washington DC, 12 June 2008.
organisations. On technical issues, the nexus around WHO, FAO, UNICEF and 
OIE is of course important, with UNSIC playing a key coordinating role, particularly 
on financial and wider policy issues. On financing, the World Bank has come to 
play quite an important, bridging role too. 
u The diagram highlights the sheer number of initiatives – and associated acronyms 
– that the HPAI response has either spawned or expanded. While no new big 
coordinating body has been established, as with UNAIDS, it is striking how many 
initiatives cluster around the core organisations at the centre of the diagram; as 
someone put it “like bees around the honey pot”.
u The cluster of actors around ‘the media’ and ‘politics’ hovers in the corner, but 
is in practice all pervasive. Different responses to the media and different styles 
of politics are important, but this dimension has been a persistent and important 
feature – both in raising the profile of the issue (and so resources) and in the 
concerns about how, without any major outbreak, the issue seems to be going ‘off 
the radar’ again, with declining media and political interest.
u There are a number of actors who appear on the periphery of the diagram: not well 
connected to the core players, nor particularly associated with the core narratives. 
These include a number of NGO players who, in different ways, have been critical 
of the mainstream framing of the debates, around livelihoods and development and 
implications for the poultry industry in the case of GRAIN31, and around intellectual 
property and virus sharing in the case of the Third World Network32. We also have a 
small circle, but representing a very large group, who have had very little influence 
on the debate so far at all: small-scale poultry producers, particularly in virus-
affected countries in Asia. These, among others, are the marginalised actors who 
frame the debate in different ways, and offer usually unheard alternative narratives. 
Section 7 will return to an examination of this group.
31 GRAIN Briefing. (2006). ‘Fowl Play - The Poultry Industry’s Central Role In The Bird Flu Crisis.’ 
from www.grain.org/go/birdflu.
32 http://www.twnside.org.sg/
An earlier diagram was prepared in the scoping phase of this project (see Scoones 
and Forster 2007), based on a review of documents and Internet source material 
available at the time. This helped us identify our starting points for carrying out 
more detailed interviews. These snowballed out from initial discussions with FAO, 
WHO and OIE to a range of organisations in Europe and North America. In total we 
had interviews with 63 people across a range of organisations (see Appendix 2). 
These have deepened and nuanced our analysis of the politics of policy process, 
extending our insights and attentions beyond the initial focus. As a very time 
delimited study, however, we could not cover everything and everybody. Given our 
focus on the international response, we have focused more on global institutions 
and their headquarters, rather than in-country experiences. This study is, however, 
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being complemented by detailed country studies in Cambodia, Indonesia, Thailand 
and Vietnam, where we are looking at the international response from the other 
end of the telescope33. We have also focused in particular on the main technical 
agencies at the heart of the response, notably WHO, FAO, OIE, together with 
UNICEF, UNOCHA and others, as well as the coordinating efforts of UNSIC and 
others, including the World Bank. While this front-line work is the most visible, there 
has of course been substantial back-up support from different funding agencies, 
notably the European Commission, USAID and other bilateral donor governments, 
many of whom we talked to. However, what follows is necessarily qualified and 
partial, but hopefully useful, in particular in identifying challenges for the future. 
In the next sections, we will first examine the three main ‘outbreak narratives’ and 
how these have framed the debate, looking at what was proposed, what happened, 
and the tensions, dilemmas and trade-offs that have arisen. We will then move on to 
look at three alternative narratives, which have often been obscured or silenced by 
the mainstream debate, but which each have important implications for the future. 
Following this, we move to an analysis of some cross-cutting themes: institutional 
and organisational architectures, the role of expertise in the context of uncertainty 
and ignorance; and the (multiple) meanings and interpretations of security and the 
implications for ‘global governance’. Each of these themes – and the analysis of the 
findings as a whole – has important implications for the future – and in particular 
what a ‘One World, One Health’ approach might look like. 
4. VETS AND VIRUSES:
THE ANIMAL HEALTH RESPONSE
Avian influenza is of course, in the first instance, a bird disease. H5N1 has affected 
billions of chickens, ducks and other poultry, as well as wild birds. For this reason 
the animal health sector legitimately argued that this was their territory. They had 
long dealt with avian influenza and Newcastle disease, a similar viral infection. 
Thus veterinarians legitimately claimed a place at the table, presenting a strong 
‘birds first’ narrative – arguing that dealing with the disease in its avian form was 
the best initial step to avoid a human pandemic.
Veterinarians have a long and distinguished professional tradition. This was their 
moment in the limelight – and the chance, as many saw it, to show that they 
knew how to stamp out a disease. The veterinary profession is associated with a 
range of organisations, the apex body being the OIE, an inter-governmental body 
I see avian flu as a chance to get things done we’d do anyway…We can use the 
PVS to position ourselves. Because this is a big crisis we can use it to do things that 
would be difficult otherwise, to get the money. The OIE sees itself as a big player in 
the avian influenza crisis34.
Similarly, FAO has a long tradition of work in the animal health field, and its Animal 
Production and Health division is seen as a source of high quality technical advice 
and field support in this area35. Yet these organisations had been, for a long period, 
both under-funded and under-recognised. As the avian influenza story hit the 
headlines, those in charge recognised the opportunity both for funds and influence. 
One senior FAO informant put it:
This put FAO really in the front line. We started making noise…The technical options 
are clear. Then there are institutional and policy solutions - we know the elements but 
how to make them work is difficult36.
33 See http://www.steps-centre.org/ourresearch/avianflu.html
with governments represented through the heads of veterinary services, usually 
the Chief Veterinary Officer. Avian influenza was a major boon to the veterinary 
community. As one informant commented:
34 Interview, London, 13 May 2008.
35 http://www.fao.org/avianflu/en/index.html
36 Interview, Rome, 30 January 2008.
The early period from late 2003 to early 2004 saw some awkward manoeuvring 
between individuals and organisations, and some hot politics. Who was going to 
get the lion’s share of the resources? Who was going to have the most influence? 
Whose organisation was going to drive the policy debate? These were difficult 
times, as OIE and FAO in particular fought it out. Inevitably strong personalities, 
personal histories and professional egos had an influence on the dynamics. But in 
the end, particularly once the Beijing pledging conference had confirmed substantial 
resources (even if some of them were loans and many recycled commitments), 
things settled down. There was enough to go round. A serious fight was not 
necessary. Indeed, a memorandum of understanding was confirmed between OIE 
and FAO which demarcated roles and responsibilities in a neat diagram. While 
the reality was more complex, a working – if occasionally tense – relationship has 
evolved which has enabled the veterinary community, at least in public, to speak 
with (more or less) one voice.
Having a clear and coherent position – structured around a strong and convincing 
narrative – is essential in any policy process. This took some time coming, but has 
eventually emerged. The veterinary narrative essentially argues that the standard 
veterinary response – using a combination of culling, movement control and 
vaccination – to eliminate the disease is all that is required. This is enshrined in the 
OIE guidelines which specify ‘eradication pathways’ for different listed diseases. 
The reporting systems that are required of national veterinary authorities are ones 
1514
that ensure early warning and rapid response, and the challenge is more logistical, 
managerial and financial. For this reason, and with much justification, the OIE 
argued that the main investments needed are in the area of boosting the lagging 
capacity of veterinary services in the developing world, bringing them up to an 
acceptable standard. The PVS (Performance, Vision, Strategy) system developed 
by the OIE37 is the tool that defines what needs to be done, and the next steps are 
investment in capacity (labs, personnel training, equipment, vaccines etc.) which 
FAO, World Bank and other agency projects would take on. 
It was clear, it was simple and it allowed money to be spent. In other words it 
was a perfect response for the moment. With the Director General of OIE astutely 
manoeuvring the organisation into the mainstream, his influence in the debate 
grew substantially and, with this, the central role of professional, government vets. 
But how did this framing of the problem and response limit and constrain, and in 
some places, undermine the global effort? The construction of a particular view of 
the disease (one of poultry, mostly chickens) and how to deal with it (eradication/
stamping out) reinforced the power and influence of certain individuals and 
organisations to the exclusion of others. The potential of endemicity, and the very 
different response requirements for Africa, for example, were often not considered. 
Similarly, the field level realities that farmers and field vets faced in places like 
Egypt, Indonesia or Vietnam were not part of the picture. This was a global 
response, facilitated by global organisations, with a globally-defined pathway of 
disease eradication. Although a membership organisation with equal voting rights, 
the OIE does not have a huge network of field offices. It relies on the reports of the 
CVOs, who are very much behoven to the organisation. The politics of knowledge, 
reporting and accountability are often fraught, with the centre, and its commissions 
and advisory groups, holding sway with debates usually dominated by European 
and North American concerns and interests. Here mass culling and eradication 
following an outbreak made sense – and indeed were imperative and worked in 
Turkey. The uniform manuals, protocols and procedures were thus seen to be the 
answer and so the ‘outbreak narrative’ dominated both diagnosis and prescription.
Another strand of work by animal health specialists, this time mostly from the 
FAO, focused on dealing with the biosecurity of poultry production units and wet 
markets. Speculation was rife about the main pathways of spread among poultry 
– was it ‘backyard flocks’ or large industrial units? Was the disease spread through 
unregulated and unhygienic trade or through wild birds? No-one seemed to know 
the answer and any detailed case analysis suggested that multiple routes were 
possible38. But this uncertainty fed into a more political argument about cause and 
blame. Here different interests, beyond simple scientific concerns, came into play. 
Much of this centred on a vision of what a safe, modern poultry sector should 
look like. For many animal health specialists, particularly those from or trained in 
37 http://www.oie.int/downld/Prep_conf_Avian_inf/A_Final_PVS.pdfavianflu.html
39 See Sims and Narrod (undated) http://www.fao.org/avianflu/documents/key_ai/key_book_
preface.htm
39 See, Burgos and Burgos (2007); Beach et al (2007).
40 See, McLeod (2008), McLeod et al (2006) or Rushton et al (2005), for example.
41 http://www.birdlife.org/news/news/2007/03/avian_flu_report.html
Europe or North America, small scale poultry production and informal wet markets 
were seen as backward and in need of modernisation. Surely development, they 
argued, should be about eliminating these practices and assuring high levels of 
hygiene and safety. Powerpoint presentations show ‘before’ and ‘after’ scenes of 
Asian markets that had been ‘restructured’ according to the designs of different 
development programmes. This became the model of what to do and, as we saw in 
the opening case study, the approach adopted in Hong Kong and beyond. 
However, this approach had its downsides, particularly for poor producers and 
consumers39. Surely, others argued, development is not just about modernisation 
of production, but also about poverty reduction and improving livelihoods40. As 
played out within FAO, for example, this debate often found veterinarians and 
socio-economists at loggerheads on appropriate ways forward. In the wider debate 
lobby groups pushed hard to ‘prove’ that their constituency were not to blame. Wild 
bird enthusiasts, for example, attempted to demonstrate that it was trade not the 
migration of wild birds that was at fault41. Advocates of smallholder farming argued 
that the blame must lie at the door of industrial capitalist production systems. But 
were these positions based on evidence or more normative positions and personal 
preferences? Until recently at least, it seemed mostly the latter. Evidence that 
wild birds are carriers of H5N1 is widespread, although the causation of particular 
outbreaks often remains uncertain. Most now agree that unregulated large scale 
production can be a major biosecurity risk, but many large units equally have top 
quality biosecurity measures and can deal with outbreaks effectively and efficiently. 
Backyard flocks tend not to be significant factors in the spread of disease as they 
are largely kept in limited places and consumed at home, while medium size flocks 
kept in cramped conditions in urban settings appear to present a particular risk, 
along with unhygienic wet markets. As new research has found, in addition to the 
3Ps (pigs, poultry and people), free grazing ducks in rice cropping areas present a 
particular challenge in some parts of Asia (Gilbert et al 2007; 2008; Hulse-Post et 
al 2005; Stum-Ramirez et al 2005). 
But these situations are often highly particular, and dependent on a wide range 
of factors from local ecological ones (such as whether ducks are part of the agro-
ecosystem; the migratory routes of wild birds; the proximity to viral ‘hot spots’ and 
so on) to the structure of the industry (the relative importance of large and small 
production units and their location), the economics of production (whether poultry 
production makes money and what incentives exist to squeeze more chickens 
into smaller spaces) and the regulatory and policy environment (health and safety 
regulations and their enforceability in markets, movement and trade restrictions 
and so on). In other words, the idea that there is a single ‘before’ and a single ‘after’ 
technical or policy solution is impractical, unworkable and possibly dangerous. 
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The dangers of a simplistic narrative line have come home to roost (to coin a term) 
in a number of places. There seems to be a certain level of denial about this in 
some quarters. The need to present a success story of the veterinary response 
to keep the money flowing can overwhelm the ability to offer honest, balanced, 
sanguine assessments42. Thus in early 2008 a number of senior officials argued 
that the viral load was decreasing and that this was a direct result of veterinary 
interventions. But when probed, the evidence for these claims seemed to be lacking. 
Undoubtedly, successes have been achieved in Turkey and parts of the Balkans, 
but there are still big problems in Indonesia, Bangladesh, India, Egypt, Nigeria, 
Vietnam and China (probably the largest global source of the virus), areas referred 
to by some as “the smoking guns”43. But we cannot be entirely sure about these or 
many other countries because of poor reporting and monitoring and we must not 
forget that the reporting is of outbreaks, not of viral load. Even in Vietnam, a poster-
child for intensive vaccination campaigns, the problems of repeated recurrence of 
outbreaks eventually had to be admitted. 
So a mixed picture was emerging which challenged, in several important respects, 
the classic outbreak and response narratives so well presented and defended by 
the animal health sector. What happens when the disease becomes entrenched or 
endemic? This is currently probably the case in six countries worldwide – Indonesia, 
Vietnam, Cambodia, China, Egypt and Nigeria44. These are the places where most 
outbreaks are recorded (see figure 1) and where most human deaths occur. Should 
a different strategy be in place in these countries? We found it incredibly difficult 
to get an answer to this question. Some reacted defensively, arguing that good 
programmes are in place and that eradication remains the aim. Others disputed the 
definition of endemism and argued that the existing systems just need to be made 
to work better. Others said it demonstrated the need to do more and build capacity. 
A few, mostly with recent field experience in these countries, were, however, more 
sanguine, saying that they were doing their best, but often simply ‘chasing the 
virus’. Indonesia was seen as perhaps the most extreme case. As some pointed 
out, the Participatory Disease Surveillance approach had been enormously 
successful, finding the virus virtually everywhere. But how did knowing this affect 
responses? Here the limits of the standard veterinary response became evident. 
People talked of the difficulties of instituting culling campaigns in Sumatra where 
deep distrust of the state and the veterinary service persisted. They talked of the 
way people hid both themselves and their poultry as soon as a government official 
came anywhere near. They talked of the difficulties that arose when compensation 
was either not paid or paid late or inadequately following mass culling procedures 
with vets in white suits and protective gear. And they talked of the futility of poultry 
bans and market closures in large, unregulated metropolitan cities like Jakarta. 
One informant reflected: 
42 Food and Agriculture Organisation (2007a); (2008a); (2008b).
43 Interview, Rome, 30 January 2008.
44 Although doubts exist about the extent of entrenchment in Nigeria.
Culling is always contentious. And without an effective compensation strategy you 
alienate people. In endemic situations does it make sense? The OIE approach is very 
much ‘first world’ – hordes of white suited professional vets going out, gassing poultry 
and disposing of them. But is this appropriate or realistic?45
Another observed:
A lot of countries remain very underprepared to face avian flu. The immediate response 
is to reach for the OIE guidelines. And the interpretation of these is problematic. In 
different contexts, they may not be appropriate. If you are a very poor country with 
limited logistical and other resources, culling may not be the answer. But very often 
they go straight for culling and ring culling…Ring culling assumes that AI is transferred 
through the environment, not through chains. The basic conceptual framework at a 
technical level is flawed. And the practical, logistical issues are difficult…in Egypt they 
culled, but did not deal with the disposal and cleaning up well. It just made the situation 
as bad. The disease persisted. It is money down the drain, and people distrust you 
too…In the panic of trying to respond – to do something, the idea is lost. We are 
trying to control a disease! The OIE Manual does not take account of the context. The 
context must include political, social, economic issues. But none of these are thought 
about…Culling has been done so badly. It has been so heavy-handed. They go into 
a village and wipe out everything. The average villager is scared shitless of the vets 
turning up. The last person they will turn to will be the public sector vet46.
Another informant noted the mobilisation against veterinary measures in Lagos, 
Nigeria. When a ban on marketing was proposed by the authorities, women traders 
marched on the government offices, besieging them. The patron of the traders’ 
association turned out (apocryphally or not, we are not sure) to be the president’s 
wife. The ban was, not surprisingly, quickly overturned.
Thus political, cultural, social and economic contexts matter. In Indonesia or 
Nigeria people have different livelihood concerns, and different perceptions of 
risk compared both to each other, and certainly to those based in Geneva, Rome 
or Washington. Even in Indonesia, with 112 confirmed human deaths to date, 
there are other, greater risks and threats to livelihoods – earthquakes, tsunamis, 
food prices and more. How does a poultry disease – one that seems ‘just like 
Newcastle’ – compete with these concerns in people’s risk framings? And, given 
the often difficult relation with technicians and agents of the state in many parts of 
the world, why should the public be expected to agree to their recommendations, 
especially if they arrive unannounced in a village dressed in protective suits and 
exterminate all their chickens, and so a significant portion of their livelihoods? 
These issues – particularly that of compensation and the problems of poor reporting 
– have certainly been topics of hot debate among the veterinary and public health 
community. Proper, effective and timely compensation is seen as a key factor in 
45 Interview, London, 25 January 2008.
46 Interview, UK, 11 March 2008.
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the response47 but in practice conditions on the ground are often unpredictable 
– and intertwined with more socio-cultural and political factors, such as historical 
relationships between citizens and the state, perceptions of and trust in expertise, 
the symbolic and cultural value of poultry, and the particular livelihood contexts of 
often very poor people. In the neat, technical narrative of the veterinary response, 
these factors rarely get a look in; and if acknowledged at all are seen as part of the 
problem: things to be got rid of in the strides towards a modern animal health system. 
So what are these points of contention, where a more thorough-going and 
searching, context-specific debate is required? Below, a few are listed which 
emerged repeatedly in our interviews:
u What is to blame backyard birds or commercial flocks – or somewhere in between? 
u What are the implications for ‘restructuring’ and ‘biosecurity’? Can bans work? 
Who wins, who loses?
u Wild birds, ducks or trade? Roles in spread and persistence in different agro-
ecological and economic settings.
u Disease dynamics – seasonality, cyclicity – and patterns of re-infection. Is 
elimination really feasible with large hot spots of ‘viral soup’ nearby?
u Culling strategies: complete, ring, or not at all? What approaches to compensation? 
Is this a high cost but low return option in many places?
u How effective is vaccination (and available vaccines)? Why is there cyclical re-
infection despite thorough campaigns? 
u Does the PVS system help design the ideal vet system - for what and for whom?
47 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTARD/Resources/HPAI_Compensation_Final.pdf
So, in the course of the past five or more years, a series of important uncertainties 
have emerged, which add question marks, points of contention and awkward 
wrinkles to the neat and tidy veterinary outbreak (and stamp out) narrative. While 
often dismissed as marginal problems, we would argue that together these present 
some more fundamental challenges. Within the policy community associated with 
the veterinary response, these debates have started. We probed these and explored 
the uncertainties with a range of different people. But, inevitably, a recasting of the 
core framing presents difficult political, institutional and personal challenges for 
those at the centre of the network. These debates are certainly about science, but 
more importantly they are about power, money and position.
What cuts across these debates is how complex, dynamic field experience in diverse 
socio-cultural and political contexts matters, and so disturbs the neat formulae (and 
manuals, protocols and pathways) offered from the international system. Also, and 
perhaps more challengingly, this experience suggests that in a number of (possibly 
increasing) places there is a need to move from a framing based on an outbreak 
and eradication mode – the standard, professional entrenched framing of veterinary 
science and practice – to a framing which acknowledges persistent, perhaps 
permanent, endemism – something that seems almost unthinkable for some. 
These tensions point to some simmering conflicts between different people and 
organisations within this actor-network, suggesting that the network is not as solid 
and water-tight as it sometimes appears. Fracture lines exist between the OIE and 
FAO, and indeed within these organisations, based on understandings of mandates 
and normative positioning (regulating veterinary standards according to universal 
global rules versus agriculture for development, livelihoods and poverty reduction, 
for example), and between head office and field vets and consultants, the latter 
experienced in the complications of the front line. And at the technical level there are 
disputes about some real uncertainties, about the structural and ecological drivers 
of the disease and its spread, and the efficacy and appropriateness of different 
intervention measures. These came to the surface, perhaps for the first time in 
public, at the OIE-FAO-WHO June 2007 technical meeting held in Rome48. Here, 
debates raged on the value of culling, particularly in increasingly endemic settings, 
with some tense stand-offs emerging in different sessions by some accounts.
Many – on both sides of these disputes – reflected on this meeting as one of the 
high points of the previous few years. At last some of the real issues were being 
discussed openly; the institutional grandstanding and the squabbling over resources 
were put aside and the real issues were being debated (at least at the technical 
level – the lack of detailed socio-cultural and livelihood analysis remained starkly 
absent). Confronting uncertainties and debating alternatives must be a good thing. 
But in highly political and often tenuous policy processes it can be dangerous. Actor 
networks can fracture, tight narratives can unravel, and the political position and 
resource flows can be threatened. It was clear that this was in some people’s minds 
by mid 2007, as the 2006 pledged funds either were used up or failed to arrive. The 
media had lost interest, politicians were beginning to question whether this really 
was ‘the big one’ that they had to be concerned with, and now the scientists and 
technicians were questioning things. Was this going to turn out to be a very, very 
short window of opportunity for the veterinary profession to show its mettle, and get 
itself funded?  
As we discuss in more detail below, by the end of 2007 at the Delhi conference, the 
actor network had once more closed ranks and put on a public face of unity and 
coherence. This for some seemed the last chance to rekindle support and interest. 
And there is nothing better than a new narrative to make this happen – for it was 
48 Food and Agriculture Organisation (2007d) http://www.fao.org/docs/eims/upload//232786/
ah671e.pdf 
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at the Delhi conference that the One World, One Health slogan was launched. 
Animal health was going to be on a par with the major players in the global scheme 
of things – human public health and ecosystem health (now often referred to in 
relation to climate change).
 
5. PUBLIC HEALTH RESPONSES
The potential major public health consequences of an influenza pandemic were of 
course the rallying cry that in the end grabbed attention and raised resources. In 
terms of positioning in the wider actor network, the WHO is very much in the centre. 
While recognising the importance of the veterinary dimensions, many in the public 
health community have little knowledge or interest in the animal origins of the 
disease49. It is the public health consequences that are, for them, the major concern. 
The Global Influenza Programme in the WHO, established in 1952 and linked 
to a network of national influenza centres, collaborating centres and reference 
laboratories, has been central to this effort50. On-going influenza monitoring, virus 
sampling and regular flu shots have been part and parcel of the global public health 
programming for decades. The model is very much that of global public health 
system, linking national systems in a global network around public delivery for 
both prevention and cure. This is the model on which the WHO was built – public 
funds for public health: the classic global public goods model. As elsewhere in the 
medical profession a technical, medical, technology driven approach (drugs and 
vaccines and hospitals) competes with a more prophylactic, preventative, primary 
care approach, where non-pharmaceutical and community based interventions are 
seen to be the most effective. 
Yet both strands exist within a framework of public support and state structures, 
very much the post-war modernist vision of development.  While this vision has 
been disturbed and questioned of late, even with the new rhetoric of public private 
partnerships, of advance purchase agreements with pharma companies, of private 
medical provision and so on, much of the old statist model still persists. A rapid 
review of annual reports of the WHO over the years for example sees new languages 
and perspectives, but a remarkable persistence in vision and commitment to public 
provision on a global scale.
49 However, within WHO a Veterinary Public Health unit existed within the Communicable Disease 
Department from 1949. A much larger programme was established in the American Region and 
it still is in place. The Inter-American joint Health and Agriculture Meetings at Ministerial Level 
(RIMSA) bring together high-level decision-makers from both agriculture and health, and 
recommendations are brought to the governing bodies of the Pan American Health Organization. 
See http://www.panaftosa.org.br/ for more details on this cross-sectoral collaboration.
50 http://www.who.int/csr/disease/influenza/en/ See: Hampson (1997) and Lazzari, S. and K. Stöhr (2004). 
Thus, for WHO, the overall narrative is firmly centred in the ‘outbreak’ mode. A 
potential major public health emergency is in the offing, it is argued. This could 
be on a par with 1918, or potentially worse. This requires a global response, with 
WHO in the lead, and substantial investment in technology (drugs, vaccines) 
and health systems (delivery, infrastructure). Within this, there are perhaps three 
overlapping strands identifiable, each associated with different groups within and 
outside WHO.
First is the technological response. This focuses on drugs and vaccines and their 
delivery. As an informant from WHO noted, this is a standard response:
Drugs, vaccines, it is inevitably the response. It is the way we operate in health 
systems. They are more tangible than behavioural responses. It is easier for a system 
to respond. It is easier to have a stockpile than tell people to wash their hands51.
Yet the details have caused a massive debate which can only be touched on here. 
There are multiple views on what is the best strategy, many of them very strongly 
held. Medical opinion combines with logistical realism with commercial pressure, 
and it is difficult to pick apart the rationales and influences52. The WHO has stock-
piled donated anti-viral drugs for rapid containment purposes, while the US has 
about 70 million treatment courses of anti-virals in federal and state stockpiles53. 
Elsewhere, no-one seems to know how far this policy has been implemented, as 
both the costs of getting hold of anti-virals such as oseltamivir and the political 
challenge of defining who is worth protecting have constraints. And then there are 
questions of efficacy. Studies in Norway in early 2008 highlighted the possibility 
that the stockpiled drugs would not work, as oseltamivir resistance to seasonal 
influenza (H1N1) was detected54. Many of the drugs stockpiled in the early period of 
the crisis are now nearing the end of their shelf life, and big decisions are pending 
relating to their replacement; a subject on which medical opinion is divided. 
Vaccination policy has been especially controversial55. While regular, seasonal 
influenza vaccination has been recommended by the WHO, uptake even in 
the west has been limited. The challenges of isolating seasonal influenza viral 
strains, manufacturing the vaccine and making a profit from it have been well 
documented (Poland and Marcuse, 2004).  Around 16 manufacturers globally are 
currently in relatively advanced stages of producing H5N1 vaccines through a 
variety of egg and cell based manufacturing techniques56. WHO has committed to 
stockpiling 50 million doses, and the European Commission has recently licensed 
51 Interview, Geneva, 5 March 2008.
52 European Vaccine Manufacturers (2005).
53 http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/influenza/biz-plan/news/apr2508iom.html
54 Lackenby et al (2008) and see http://www.who.int/csr/disease/influenza/oseltamivir_summary/en/index.
html. See also Lipsitch et al (2007); de Jong et al (2005).
55 See: Fedson (2003, 2005); Monto (2006); Subbarao and Joseph (2007); Flahault et al (2006).
56 http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/WHO_HSE_EPR_GIP_2008_1/en/index.html
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GlaxoSmithKline’s vaccine Prepandrix57. Yet global estimates suggest that, given 
current manufacturing capacity, only 500 million doses would be available 12 months 
after a pandemic outbreak. There are hopes that the use of vaccine adjuvants to 
reduce the required dose will increase capacity (Yamada et al 2008). But would 
this be sufficient in the timeframe and on the scale of a global pandemic? Who 
would make a pandemic vaccine? Where? Who would have access and who would 
not? What financing models would work? These are tough questions touching on 
intellectual property, business models and corporate profits, as well as medical 
ethical and moral dilemmas. They are such sensitive discussions that they do not 
often occur in polite conversation. The current realities put into question all the 
worthy commitments to global health equity, as the reality is clear – only a few, 
relatively rich people will have access to any vaccine, given the current global 
distribution of manufacturing capacity, the costs of production and distribution and 
the lack of cold chain and other facilities in many parts of the world. And even the 
rich, northern elite will be lucky to get anything if the pandemic spreads quickly with 
dramatic effects on economies, transport and mortality. In the end it may be only 
politicians, the military and some health professionals who benefit. 
But of course no one knows the details of the future prospects and consequences of 
a human pandemic, and that’s the point. While the debate can often seem very dense 
and technical with long discussions of genomic sequencing, antibody responses, 
vaccine adjuvants and so on, most people we talked to, when pushed, said that 
they had no idea what might work and what might happen. Of course this is not an 
argument for doing nothing, and indeed the substantial investments in research on 
vaccines of different sorts (both into types – RNA, killed, attenuated, subunit) and 
production methods (traditional egg cultures, cell based and so on) may well pay 
off, as well as the commitments to ensuring a more widely distributed manufacturing 
capacity is in place. These programmes are absorbing substantial funds, with 
uncertain pay-offs. For example, the European Commission’s high profile research 
programme on influenza, costed at over EUR 65 million58, has most of these resources 
invested in upstream vaccine research by partnerships of university departments 
and biotech and pharma companies across Europe59. Similarly, support to new 
manufacturing capacity in the developing world, while backed by private finance, 
is being supported by public funds. To date, nearly 100 low and middle income 
countries have told WHO that they want financial support for increasing access to a 
pandemic vaccine, and in April 2007 WHO approved initial grants of $2.5m each to 
six manufacturers from Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Thailand, and Vietnam60. 
57 The Lancet Infectious Diseases - Vol. 8, Issue 7, July 2008, Page 409. The WHO stock-pile 
relates to rapid containment only, but has been a recommendation from the Strategic Advisory 
Group of Experts on Immunization to stockpile 150 million doses for rapid containment and 
emergency personnel in low and middle income countries.
58 European Commission, Influenza Research EU funded projects 2001-7, Luxembourg 2007 (EUR2282)
59 http://ec.europa.eu/research/health/influenza/projects_en.html
60 http://www.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/334/7600/925-a?ck=nck. See the WHO’s Global Pandemic 
Influenza Action Plan to Increase Vaccine Supply (2006) at http://www.who.int/vaccines-
documents/DocsPDF06/863.pdf.
But all of this is about the future, some of it potentially very long term. At the moment, 
what is the technological front-line? So-called H5 ‘pre-pandemic’ vaccines are 
available, but while good as a sales pitch for certain big pharma companies, they 
only provide some generic immunity to viruses resembling the one that may (or 
may not) be a pandemic strain. ‘Pre-pandemic’, as some informants pointed out, 
is a misnomer – as until the pandemic happens, we don’t know what to immunise 
against, so this is a potentially expensive guessing game. Of course, the ‘holy grail’, 
as one scientist put it, is a universal vaccine which provides a combined response 
to a dozen or more influenza virus types, but this seems a long way off. As with 
other difficult-to-treat diseases, the influenza virus is incredibly variable, prone to 
rapid change in properties and difficult to pin down with a vaccination strategy 
which is not continuously adapting - seasonal virus vaccine strains must be re-
assessed each year in each hemisphere. Indeed, many argue that the ‘silver bullet’ 
solution is a false promise, providing funds for expensive labs but little else. Such 
sceptics argue that the only feasible vaccine solution would have to be based on a 
global commitment to an infrastructure for universal provision of season influenza 
vaccine, and undertaking that would cost substantial resources and would have 
to be backed by public money on a massive scale. As several people pointed out, 
there are nowhere near six billion syringes and needles, let along vaccine vials, 
being produced or even stored right now, and no likelihood that this will happen 
any time in the near future.
In sum the technology fix narrative strand – addressing the outbreak through 
solely technological means – looks shaky when probed. Yet this contrasts with 
the up-beat assessments by commercial outfits with pipeline research and 
development investments and public-philanthropic funding commitments of the 
Gates Foundation, Wellcome Trust and others. Most technicians and researchers 
admit the challenges freely, but those in the core policy and business circuits are 
more reluctant, given the investments and commitments being made. The focus 
on technology-as-solution is thus backed by big players in a strong, mutually 
reinforcing network. Cynics point to the ‘revolving door’ between public agencies 
such as the WHO, philanthropic organisations and big pharma, and how a particular 
version of the outbreak narrative feeds into support for commercial interests and 
particular research efforts61. But such arguments are countered strongly by pointing 
out that synergies between public, private and philanthropic efforts are essential 
given the scale of the challenge, and that the efforts in technology development are 
for the long-term – and in the scale of things where public money is spent (the most 
frequently mentioned of course were defence commitments in Iraq or Afghanistan), 
this is small fry62.
61 There was comment for example when Klaus Stöhr, formerly head of the Global Influenza 
Programme and a staunch supporter of global vaccine programmes left for Novartis to head up 
their vaccine R and D (see WHO flu chief leaves for Novartis, http://www.the-scientist.com/news/
display/43504/). 
62 The war in Iraq is calculated to cost $341 million per day; the UK’s NHS budget was £90 billion 
in 2007; in 2008 the UK’s MoD announced a contract price of £3.2 billion for two new aircraft carriers.
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A second public health narrative focuses on non-pharma options. This emphasises 
public education and communication, as well as measures such as ‘social distancing’ 
in the face of an outbreak to reduce infection and mortality. The assumption is that 
the technological fixes will not be available or sufficient, so the most efficacious 
response may be through changing behaviour. A variety of ‘knowledge, attitude and 
practice’ surveys were done63, in the standard vein of public health research, and 
with all the problems associated with them. In addition, a variety of communication 
messages for public education were developed in different parts of the world64. 
With funds from the Japanese government, UNICEF had led these efforts, with 
WHO and a number of NGOs involved. 
UNICEF’s main concern, starting in early 2006, has been changing human behaviour 
to prevent animal-to-human transmission of H5N1 virus. These programmes 
are in a familiar mode for UNICEF and other learning and social change health 
programming, focusing on a few standard health messages (wash hands, cook 
meat properly, don’t let kids work or play with chickens and so on). An informant 
from UNICEF explained the history:
Following Beijing, it was identified that communications were going to be key for 
both prevention and control, and an inter-agency meeting was organised in Geneva 
with WHO, FAO, UNICEF, and others from the regional offices…The result was 
distilled into the four main points - reporting, cooking, separating, hand-washing. 
So the messages were identified after consultation with the technical agencies as 
reasonably simple, attainable and effective and feasible actions very much with the 
backyard farmers in mind65.
Only now is UNICEF moving towards pandemic mitigation, which involves 
prescriptions and routines for health etiquettes, quarantine, social distancing and 
so on. In the developed world at least, this approach received a boost in February 
2007 when the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, together with the 
Departments of Commerce, Transport, and Health and Human Services, published 
‘Interim Pre-pandemic Planning Guidance: Community Strategy for Pandemic 
Influenza Mitigation in the United States – Early, Targeted, Layered Use of Non-
pharmaceutical Interventions’66. This involved plans for closing schools, cancelling 
public gatherings, organising work leave, tele-working strategies and so on. At 
the time, it was seen as an acceptance of the limitations of the pharmaceutical 
response, a realisation that the pandemic would hit months before any vaccine was 
available, and that the only other prophylaxes – antivirals – were in limited supply, 
of unproven efficacy, and essentially untested in a pandemic scenario. 
Hot on the heels of this move came two historical studies funded by the US National 
Institutes of Health. One found that in the 1918 pandemic, rapid social containment 
measures had cut peak weekly death rates in some US cities by up to half. In the 
most extreme case, the peak mortality rate in Philadelphia was eight times that of St. 
Louis, which had been quicker to implement social control measures (Hatchett et al 
2007). The other study (Bootsma and Ferguson 2007) used mathematical models to 
reproduce the pattern of the 1918 pandemic and found that cities that had relaxed their 
restrictions after the peak of the pandemic often saw the re-emergence of infection.
Now – in the US at least – the ramifications of twenty-first century style social 
distancing are beginning to be better understood. There are optimistic aspirations 
towards communities developing their ‘social capital’, and of all households being 
rich and organised enough to hold six weeks food in reserve. But what happens if 
there is mass panic? The social, political and security consequences remain largely 
unaddressed. In other parts of the world, such ‘social distancing’ approaches 
may not work. As one informant put it “It’s all very well having this simple idea of 
everybody staying at home, but if it’s ten in a room, in a home that is no distance 
from the next, it doesn’t really make any sense. We need ideas that are going to 
work”67. Another observed: 
It is accepted…that containment will not work. In all countries with humanitarian crises, 
governance tends to be weak. How can such strategies be implemented? Even in 
Europe. We are already moving to the next step – response. But what realistically can 
be done? Some basic capacity issues, yes. Keep the electricity functioning, ensure 
some basis services. This is important. But vaccines and so on? No. Basically you 
are on your own. Sit indoors and hope for the best!68
But in the professional worlds of vets, medics and agronomists, the advertising 
buyers, copywriters and vague creative types that make up the communications 
department don’t get much space at the table. One informant commented “UNICEF 
is not an equal in the interagency debate”69. Another observed:
We see it at the international meetings. The whole day can be very animal focused - 
vaccination, culling and so on - with just an hour maybe at the end to talk about the social 
aspects - things like closing schools, transport issues. The vets are not keen to accept that 
the threat of a human pandemic has driven much of the momentum, action and funding. 
If it was just an animal threat, we would not have seen anything like this response70.
63 For example in Egypt (http://www.comminit.com/en/node/223876) and Cambodia (http://www.
foodsecurity.gov.kh/docs/ENG/KAP-Surway-Evaluation-Poultry.pdf).
64 http://www.unicef.org/influenzaresources/
65 Interview, New York, 19 June 2008.
66 USA Department Of Health And Human Services (2007).
67 Interview, New York, 10 June 2008.
68 Interview, Geneva, 5 March 2008.
69 Interview, New York, 9 June 2008.
70 Interview, New York, 10 June 2008.
It is also the case that the nature of UNICEF’s avian influenza funding created its 
own dynamics. First, it was specifically targeted at East Asia. Second, the distinct 
and separate nature of UNICEF’s initial funding stream (from the government 
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of Japan) meant that UNICEF was to some (albeit small) degree made remote 
from the other agencies. Third, when the Japanese money ran out there was, as 
someone put it, “a huge sucking sound”71, and there are now worries all round 
that a large expectation has been generated that will not be fulfilled, and that the 
communications component of the response has not been regularised and bedded-in.
Nevertheless, avian influenza communications programmes have raised awareness 
levels significantly in many places that there is a new deadly chicken disease that 
can affect humans. Specific, most often domestic behaviours, such as cooking 
procedures and hand washing, have proved relatively easy to influence, but more 
detailed knowledge and behaviours about what should be done in the case of more 
animal-focused activities such as reporting and separation have proved more difficult. 
And only now, in 2008, are the most obvious social and behavioural aspects of 
infection and disease spread, such as gender, being investigated (Velasco et al 2008).
No systematic studies, to our knowledge, have really delved into the understandings 
of people’s risk perceptions and how cultural practices might affect their responses. 
The practice of drinking duck’s blood, common in parts of Asia, was looked upon by 
some with revulsion and horror, rather than as something that had to be understood 
in embedded cultural terms. Similarly, the social, economic and prestige associated 
with birds in places like Thailand, where prize fighting cocks are very much valued, 
was not seen as central. Indeed, when people rejected the health messages of 
different programmes in Sumatra, one informant – a communications professional 
– talked of the ‘hocus pocus’ witchcraft involved72. The people were seen as 
backward and in need of modernisation, and their fatalism about death and disease 
something that could be overcome through education and propaganda. That it 
failed seemed to be a surprise, only acting to reinforce cultural prejudices. 
Thus the non-pharma interventions have been, with a few notable exceptions73, 
largely constructed around a fairly top-down, instrumentalist version of behaviour 
change, which in the context of a pandemic setting would have to be enforced. 
Understanding alternative narratives of the disease and its impact have, as in other 
approaches already discussed, not been a priority.
A third important public health narrative emphasises less the measures to be taken 
but more the system within which the measures are supposed to be delivered. This is 
the classic ‘health systems’ approach: it is argued that with a well-functioning system, 
responsive to local needs and supplying high quality care, and with appropriate 
technological back-up, any outbreak, whether pandemic influenza or something 
else, can be dealt with. This is similar to the stance taken by the veterinarians, 
as we have seen. With decades of underfunding and with many national health 
systems in a flux of quasi-privatisation, pandemic influenza resources could, it is 
71 Interview, Washington DC, 12 June 2008.
72 Interview, Geneva, 5 March 2008.
73 See http://www.comminit.com/en/avianinfluenza.html
argued, help rebuild some of these systems which are currently in deep disrepair. 
This is a classic global public goods response, contributing to proofing the world 
against a future pandemic (cf. Smith and MacKellar 2007).
And, like the vets, the medical professionals in WHO and beyond know what a 
good health system should look like: structured, ordered, well resourced, state 
funded, and run by doctors (something similar to Germany, France, the UK, or 
Sweden). Information, prediction and early warning is key for this to work well. And 
a responsive system which allows the right response to happen at the right time, in 
the right place. For this reason, and as discussed further in section 5, substantial 
investment in information systems and surveillance is seen as critical. 
Of course most of the world is not like western Europe and the ideal health system 
probably doesn’t exist anywhere. Whether it is a desirable or achievable goal is also 
widely questioned, given the realities on the ground, where hybrid public-private-
traditional systems exist in highly unregulated and poorly resourced settings, and 
where, increasingly, services can be purchased in pharmacists and on the Internet 
(Bloom et al 2007). 
Again, as with the veterinary response, when probed, no-one quite knows what 
will work where and when – and for whom. The basic models are based on North 
American or European responses, with different emphases on technological, non-
pharma and health system responses, yet reality often acts to undermine and 
challenge these idealised narratives in practice. There are some big interests at 
play here – and it is not surprising that large pharmaceutical and biotechnology 
companies are pushing technological solutions, hoping for public funding to offset 
their commercial risks. 
For the WHO, and others making the case for global public health, the avian 
influenza crisis came at a good time. The wider public health narrative served 
institutional purposes well. As a UN agency whose core resources had declined 
over time, and whose primacy of position had been overtaken by other initiatives 
such as the Global Fund or UNAIDS, building on the long-term influenza programme 
and undoubted experience and expertise offered an opportunity to present WHO 
as the core organisation able to respond to the potential crisis. The then Director 
General, Lee Jong-Wook, made the case and galvanised early support from the 
UN system, and from the Secretary General in particular. The International Health 
Regulations, seen as a revalorisation of the WHO with new powers to operate at 
a global level, were approved with the avian flu crisis providing an important spur 
to action. Funds to the WHO started to flow and information and virus tracking 
systems, as well as laboratory and vaccine facilities, were planned and built. Lee 
however died suddenly in May 2006, and a successor had to be found. Margaret 
Chan was appointed, whose experience of successfully dealing with the SARS 
outbreak in Hong Kong was seen as a key factor in her appointment. She quickly 
saw the importance of the avian influenza issue, and, drawing on her experience, 
backed the WHO avian influenza initiatives.  
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However, as discussed at greater length in section 8, the international coordination 
of the avian flu response changed over time, particularly within the UN system. 
When David Nabarro – a British medical doctor who had previously worked at WHO, 
and before that at DFID – was appointed by the Secretary General to head UNSIC, 
the centre of gravity shifted from Geneva to New York. There was also pressure to 
make the response more coordinated and coherent, with technical agencies across 
the UN (notably WHO, FAO, UNICEF, but also WFP, UNOCHA and others) and 
outside (notably OIE and the World Bank, but also others) speaking off one sheet. 
As discussed in section 8, this was no easy task. And to this day, there are those 
in WHO who resent this move towards cross-agency coordination. This surely was 
a WHO mandate, they argue, and why was the Secretary General and UNDG, and 
increasingly the World Bank, none of them health specialists, meddling in this when 
the obvious technical capacity sits within the mandated UN agency? 
This resentment has persisted and coloured some initiatives and efforts. The DG, 
Margaret Chan, however has regularly risen above these usually local wrangles 
of territory and resources, and committed the WHO publicly to the more joined up 
cause, often emphasising the non-health aspects of avian influenza in speeches, not 
always to the delight of her colleagues. This changing and sometimes ambivalent 
positioning of the WHO in the policy process is central to understanding both the 
process and its outcomes. 
The vision of the WHO, with new International Health Regulations under its belt, as 
the guarantor of global health security is a strong one, articulated forcefully in both 
numerous publications and many of the interviews we conducted. The security 
discourse is important, as discussed in section 9. The language is often telling. 
This highlights the role of cross-border intervention, with medics being the army 
fighting the war against the disease with the weapons of vaccines and drugs. But 
often this is wrapped up in a higher, more worthy, moral language of ‘responsibility’ 
and ‘rights’, equally important dimensions of the WHO vision. Unlike perhaps the 
veterinary world, where issues of capability, rights and access don’t get a look in, 
these are very much part of the discourse in the public health world. Yet in both 
the military and the access/rights-focused metaphors and linguistic turns, a rather 
benevolent, top-down, we-know-best version comes across. As several informants 
put it “you have to remember this place (referring to the WHO) is full of doctors”. 
But there is also humility amongst the bravado. In particular, a number of more 
senior figures commented on the failures of the public health community globally 
to respond to the HIV/AIDS pandemic effectively. This is a scar on the conscience 
of some, and something that, as committed professionals, they do not want to 
repeat. Yet, at the same time, a familiar refrain is that they do not want to repeat the 
UNAIDS solution. The UNAIDS building, with its fine public sculptures and modern 
architecture sits opposite the WHO building. It is regarded by those in the WHO with 
a mixture of disdain and envy. Envy for the profile and resources, but disdain for the 
waste, lack of technical skills and, in some people’s assessment, a poor record of 
achievement. Those involved in the avian influenza response are proud that they 
have developed a leaner, more efficient and technically informed response, which 
does not need a fancy new building, but can build on the in-house capacities and 
experiences of the WHO in particular. 
However, there is concern evident in the corridors of the WHO and other agencies 
working on the public health side. The longer the pandemic doesn’t happen, the 
more questions are raised about avian influenza as a human, public health priority. 
Surely there are other more pressing problems – what about the big killers like 
malaria or diarrhoeal diseases? Is this the best way to spend money, some ask? 
This is a real dilemma, and one that again raises the spectre of shameful negligence 
on the scale of HIV/AIDS which no-one wants to repeat. 
As things stand, a wide range of uncertainties persist – from the big unknown (will a 
pandemic happen at all, and if so when?) to the specific unknowns (about vaccination 
and drug efficacy, about behaviour change in situations of crisis and so on). Again, 
rather echoing the on-going debates about other responses to epidemics such as 
HIV/AIDS, debates rage on whether a treatment focused approach (drugs/vaccines) 
makes sense, or whether preventative approaches (behaviour change) have the 
best results, or whether both have a role. Should the response be led by the state, 
or can private providers and community action offer better and cheaper solutions? 
Or can some form of partnership be developed that transcends these boundaries? 
As we have seen, different narratives about cause and effect, problem and 
solution compete in the public health field, but all respond to a characteristic 
‘outbreak narrative’ and are confined to a fairly technical, formulaic response, with 
uncertainties of all sorts pervading. But the big question remains: is this enough? 
Are the combined measures of vaccine and drug development and stockpiling, 
behaviour change and public education and health system improvement really 
increasing the world’s resilience to uncertain future zoonotic threats? Who is 
left out – and where? What alternative narratives are obscured by the dominant 
framing, and what structural inequalities are sustained or provoked by the political 
interests that prevail? These are questions that are picked up in section 10. First, 
however, we take a look at a third major narrative surrounding avian flu: pandemic 
preparedness and emergency response.
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6. PANDEMIC PREPAREDNESS
Another strand of activity, again firmly centred on an ‘outbreak narrative’, focuses on 
pandemic preparedness. This is much larger than the public health response, and 
links to wider issues of economic risk management, business continuity planning, 
civil contingency and emergency response. In this narrative, the worst needs to 
be prepared for…and it could be very bad. With food supplies restricted, energy 
systems disrupted and the Internet down, widespread panic and fear could grip any 
population faced with overloaded hospitals, sick or absent medical staff, numerous 
corpses, and military-style containment measures. Of course no-one knows the 
likelihood of any of this happening, and many regard it as highly unlikely given 
the way the H5N1 strain has been evolving74. Nevertheless pandemic influenza 
is high on the risk registers of national security agencies, and prime ministers and 
presidents don’t want to mess up. As one informant described:
This global pandemic response element is being driven by the US, Japan, Europe, 
Australia of course, but it is a genuine developmental problem – it will be the 
developing world that will be most hit. We all have to have pandemic preparedness... 
the first line of defence is seen to be the developing world75.
The US in particular has taken this side of things very seriously. To date it has 
been untouched by the avian disease, and SARS only got as far as Canada. Yet 
preparing for a pandemic has been highlighted as a major priority by the Bush 
administration over the last few years, and substantial resources have been spent 
across government and business. Local government and city authorities, Wall Street 
and the corporate world, and the military, have all undertaken big simulations, and 
made significant investments. Significant too is a different culture of threat, fear and 
anxiety in the US, where safety and security are seen as a paramount, especially 
since the attack on the twin towers in September 2001. As one informant explained:
What drove it from the White House was the national strategy. That document is 
our best shot at identifying the totality of what a pandemic would bring. By having 
our Department of Homeland Security focussed on the critical issues – by getting 
the department of aviation to work with the airline industry for example – it really 
is looking at the totality of it, going far beyond the human outbreak, far beyond the 
animal outbreak, but at the same time we have to realise its limitations76.
74 Horimoto et al (2004).
75 Interview, London, 25 January 2008.
76 Interview, Washington DC, 11 June 2008.
The UN system has taken the pandemic threat seriously too. In 2005, the Secretary 
General, then Kofi Annan, called a high level meeting and urged a cross agency 
response, with a central coordinating unit based in the UN Development Group at 
UNDP. The first concern was internal: how was the UN going to respond? What 
was going to be required of the UN system in the event of a major outbreak? How 
was the UN going to ‘survive to serve’ – to keep its own people alive and healthy in 
order to help others around the world? This was, for some, thinking the unthinkable. 
Many in the agencies dismissed this as alarmism: they were busy people, they had 
their own projects to get on with. But others in senior administrative positions have 
increasingly taken the pandemic preparedness agenda on board. 
Consequently agencies across the UN have prepared plans, and a subset has 
undertaken simulation exercises to test these plans. A number of cross-UN 
exercises have been undertaken to test out what might happen under different 
circumstances. UNOCHA, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs, and its specialised Pandemic Influenza Contingency (PIC) team, has taken 
the lead within the UN system, supported by the World Food Programme and others. 
They have developed a number of training modules and have worked intensively 
with UN country teams across the world77. They have a ‘UN system pandemic 
preparedness map’ and indicators to show the level of preparedness around the 
world, showing the vast majority of the world to be ‘less or medium prepared’78.
Many involved in this effort are brutally honest about the level of preparedness. 
The world is definitely not, they say. It might be more so now than before, but if a 
pandemic emerges quickly, is identified late and spreads fast with characteristics 
that result in high mortalities, the plans and preparations may not be worth much: 
Our assumption is that systems will fail. No early warning, or a cull of chickens… We 
simulate two weeks of confusion. We try to be realistic. Total a six week period. At the 
end of the first week – identification of a novel virus. Containment is on-going. Week 
two - containment fails. Week three - three countries are swamped. Week four – it’s 
a global pandemic.79  
77 http://ocha.unog.ch/drptoolkit/PSimulations.html
78 http://www.un-pic.org/pic/web/index.aspx
79 Interview, Geneva, 6 March 2008.
80  Interview, Washington DC, 11 June 2008.
Another informant commented:
Given the complexities of the pandemic, given the resources that would be required 
to deal with the severe one, we will never prepare.80
Yet everyone also stresses forcefully, this should not mean we just adopt a fatalistic 
complacency and do nothing. For this reason, they argue, investing in pandemic 
preparedness planning and developing contingency arrangements and emergency 
systems are essential. These are useful anyway, as they could be used for other 
disaster situations, whether an earthquake, flood or terror attack. Certain principles 
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apply: clear information systems, short chains of command, centralised decision 
making, clear areas of responsibility, stockpiled resources which can be mobilised 
at speed and a rehearsed pattern of action which can be unrolled quickly. 
In practice, of course, the experience has been mixed81. According to the UNSIC/
World Bank Progress Report (2007), 120 pandemic preparedness plans have been 
developed around the world. Most of these have been drafted by cross-ministry 
groups, often under a senior official with political clout – if not the president or 
prime minister at least their deputies. This is seen as an important success: there 
is political buy-in, cross-government coordination and an agreed plan. But a little 
probing suggests that this may be more form than substance. Most plans are long, 
turgid documents, developed from templates elsewhere. ‘Useless’, ‘not worth 
the paper they are written on’, ‘creating a false sense of security’ were some of 
the comments we heard – including from those who helped prepare them. And, 
although they may exist on paper, most have not been tested at all. Thus all sorts of 
grand plans exist, but there is a certainty that they won’t happen in practice. “How 
can you expect hundreds of trucks to be mobilised to transport food to containment 
areas when there are no stockpiles of either food or fuel?” someone asked82. A 
few countries have carried out detailed simulations of their plans under a range of 
circumstances, including the UK83, but even in these contexts (rich, well resourced), 
there is some doubt about the plans’ likely effectiveness. Getting engagement with 
planning for the unknown is difficult, even within the UN system. As one informant 
put it “it’s so hard to get people to focus on an emerging pandemic. They say ‘Leave 
me alone...I have a programme to run’”84.
So, despite the doubts and concerns, the pandemic preparedness narrative 
continues to take up a lot time and effort - and a large chunk of the global resources. 
With avian influenza framed as a ‘crisis’ or an ‘emergency’, far more resources were 
mobilised than if it was cast as a development problem of poor people’s poultry. The 
crisis and emergency framing has its advantages – there is urgency, money flows 
and political commitment at the highest level is there. But it has its downsides: the 
money is fickle, short-term and tied to rapid response and timeframes; it can create 
distorting incentives and lack of strategic thinking; people are employed on short-
term contracts with short-term money; and, because it is under the detailed scrutiny 
of the political masters, it can be used in ways that technically may not make sense 
to meet short-term political objectives.
The world of crises and emergencies is thus very different to the highly technical, 
often quite academic, cultures of the veterinary and public health responses 
discussed above. Across the avian influenza response the mix and interactions 
have not always been easy, resulting in frustration, competition and confusion at 
times. Within the UN, for example, the humanitarian and emergency arm think 
in very different ways. They draw from military planning, logistics management 
and operations thinking, not technical understandings of epidemiology, ecology 
or economics. They focus on action and results, quickly and efficiently, rather 
than long-term solutions to complex development challenges. The language is of 
‘emergency campaigns’ and ‘surge responses’. It has quite a gung-ho, muscular 
feel to it, which sometimes does not go down well in other settings. A number of 
fairly standard disaster and emergency systems have been adopted and adapted 
for the avian influenza response. From the US forest service, the ‘all-hazards 
approach’ has been pushed by USDA and USAID in their programming around 
the world85. The investment in surveillance, information and emergency response 
systems has been substantial, with emergency operations rooms installed in both 
FAO and WHO to help coordinate response to outbreaks. 
In the WHO a former underground cinema room has been converted into a state-of-
the-art emergency room86 – the SHOC room . Around a large table a set of screens 
provide up to the minute information on the unfolding of different outbreaks and 
the responses being made. Banks of computers sit behind the room, with intercom 
and video link systems allowing connections with key experts in different parts of 
the globe. On the day we visited avian influenza outbreaks featured prominently, 
alongside cholera, Rift Valley fever and Yellow fever. It is an impressive set-up. At 
the FAO another room, the Crisis Management Centre (CMC)87, furnished in bright 
orange and known informally as the Guantanamo room, offers the same service 
and links to the WHO centre through daily tele/video conferences.  
But how effective will this impressive infrastructure be if a pandemic really occurs? 
It is clear that the neat Phase 1 to 6 pattern of a slow and paced evolution of 
a pandemic may not occur as the manuals suggest88. The WHO pandemic 
81 See Fauci (2006); Coker and Mounier-Jack (2006); Mounier-Jack and Coker (2006); Webby and 
Webster (2003).
82 Discussion, Geneva, 6 March 2008.
83 http://www.ukresilience.gov.uk/pandemicflu/exercises.aspx
84 Interview, Geneva, 7 March 2008.
85 http://www.fs.fed.us/global/aboutus/dmp/welcome.htm
86 The J.W. Lee Strategic Health Operations Centre, http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/84/10/06-
011006/en/
87 http://www.fao.org/askfao/viewquestiondetails.do?questionId=51613
88 See: http://www.who.int/csr/disease/influenza/pandemic/en/. The six phases identified by WHO 
move from an inter-pandemic period (Phase 1: No new influenza virus subtypes have been 
detected in humans. An influenza virus subtype that has caused human infection may be present 
in animals. If present in animals, the risk of human infection or disease is considered to be low; 
Phase 2: No new influenza virus subtypes have been detected in humans. However, a circulating 
animal influenza virus subtype poses a substantial risk of human disease) to a pandemic alert 
period (Phase 3: Human infection(s) with a new subtype, but no human-to-human spread, or at 
most rare instances of spread to a close contact (“person-to-person”). Phase 4: Small cluster(s) 
with limited human-to-human transmission but spread is highly localized, suggesting that the 
virus is not well adapted to humans. Phase 5: Larger cluster(s) but human-to-human spread 
still localized, suggesting that the virus is becoming increasingly better adapted to humans, but 
may not yet be fully transmissible (substantial pandemic risk)) to a pandemic period (Phase 
6: Pandemic: increased and sustained transmission in general population).(see http://www.
who.int/csr/resources/publications/influenza/GIP_2005_5Eweb.pdf for the Global Pandemic 
Preparedness Plan, WHO, 2005).
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preparedness documents show how early detection results in rapid containment 
and a slowing of the pandemic in Phases 3 and 4, allowing time to get ready 
for the major consequences of the outbreak in the full global pandemic phase. 
These carefully produced booklets and presentations are, however, open to some 
questioning – and not a little derision. As many point out, we may not see a Phase 
3 or 4 at all, as a real pandemic strain will spread in days to every major city in the 
world. And by Phase 5 or 6, countries will “be on their own”. Ideas of containment 
are accepted as wishful thinking by many, with some finding echoes of Cold 
War thinking. Without extreme and highly disciplined military force, restricting a 
population to a small area would be impossible. Few governments would be able 
to enforce such a strategy, even if it made sense from the epidemiological point of 
view. When asked what he would do if a pandemic occurred, a senior official at the 
WHO answered succinctly: “head for the hills”. It was not a joke. 
So, deep uncertainties remain – about information accuracy, prediction possibilities 
and response strategies – and no-one know quite what will happen when. Will we 
be faced with a damp squib ‘slow-burn’ epidemic, or a global catastrophe? Or will 
nothing happen in our lifetimes?
An important question we return to below is whether this collective global response 
has resulted in a safer world, more resilient to future disease episodes – either in 
pandemic outbreak mode or not. We asked this question to a number of people 
involved in the international response to avian influenza and there were two views – 
yes…and no. These reflect institutional positions, technical knowledge and personal 
outlooks, but, more fundamentally, we suggest they reflect an important contrast 
in perspective between those who see a risk management approach as increasing 
safety and resilience, and those who argue that recognising uncertainty and 
ignorance as central requires a different approach – and indeed that conventional 
approaches to risk management may even make things riskier. 
We will return to this debate in section 10. In the meantime, we want to turn to 
some alternative narratives that have been obscured by the dominant outbreak 
narratives discussed in the previous sections. For it is these – often discussed on 
the margins by those outside the main circuits of power and influence – that may 
offer insights into what has been missed in the mainstream response, and pose 
challenges to the way things have been done to date.
7. MISSING DEBATES, ALTERNATIVE NARRATIVES
Looking across the three main outbreak narratives discussed so far, we have to ask 
what is missing, obscured, hidden or blocked? Is there a set of alternative narrative 
framings that emerge from the margins as critiques of the mainstream? Rosenberg 
(1992) has argued that epidemics can be explained in at least three radically 
different ways – contamination (focused on disease transmission), configuration 
(focused on disease context) and disposition (related to the individual carrier of 
the disease). Each is important, and each has had different influences on our 
understandings of, and responses to, public health over time, he argues. Yet, the 
contamination strand, and its emphasis on disease outbreaks, laboratory diagnosis 
and a treatment response has dominated at least since the mid-twentieth century. 
As we have seen, this has certainly been true in the case of the avian influenza 
example, but what about other explanations of epidemics? Arguments centred on 
disposition have been important – the ‘super-spreaders’ of recent epidemiological 
models have often focused on particular individuals. Outbreak narratives often 
involve an important individual – from Mary Mallon (Typhoid Mary) in 1907 in the 
USA to the doctor who carried SARS to Hong Kong’s Metropole Hotel in 2003 
– and, although no single individual or group has been identified as a ‘super-
spreader’ in the epidemiological sense in the unfolding drama of avian influenza, 
certain groups have been pinpointed as being more significant in the spread – and 
blamed for it. Thus, backyard chicken farmers and wet market traders in Asia – and 
the Chinese perhaps in particular – have been fingered. The focus on ‘risk groups’ 
and particular agents of spread may remove emphasis from the wider context, the 
epidemic’s ‘configuration’ in Rosenberg’s terms. 
In the welter of activity, funds, people and acronyms that the mainstream ‘outbreak’ 
and ‘contamination’ approaches have generated, it is easy to ignore alternative 
framings. Some of these are presented, not as alternatives or challenges to the 
mainstream views, but as complements, additions and nuances. Often they are 
articulated together with the mainstream narratives, but more as a polite add-
on, a superficial dressing, or an acknowledgement of alternative views, before 
proceeding with the main argument. These different framings are not always 
presented by radical opponents of the mainstream. Many of the most articulate 
advocates of these views work within or for the core organisations at the centre of 
the actor-network. Thus the relationship between these narratives and what has 
been discussed before is complex. 
We suggest, however, that they each, in different ways, offer insights that are not 
fully dealt with in the mainstream outbreak narratives, and present interesting 
challenges to the way an international response to avian influenza – or indeed 
other zoonotic diseases under the ‘One World, One Health’ banner – needs to be 
thought about. This section, therefore, addresses three alternative narratives. The 
first focuses on the causes of the disease and its dynamics; the second focuses on 
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the way normative concerns about poverty, livelihoods and equity are treated; and 
the third focuses on questions of access and global governance. In different ways, 
each suggests challenges for the One World, One Health agenda which are not 
immediately obvious in the mainstream approaches discussed so far.
DYNAMIC DRIVERS AND UNDERLYING CAUSES OF NEW DISEASES
The outbreak narrative and associated emergency/crisis response tend to focus 
on the outbreak event, not the underlying causes. Information systems are based 
on reporting outbreaks, not changing epidemiological dynamics, for instance. And 
responses tend to hone in on the diseased organism with treatment measures, or 
the diseased area with disease control/eradication measures. This applies to both 
the human and veterinary response framings. This is replicated in the emergency 
response which focuses on mitigating the worst impacts of an outbreak, both ‘at 
source’ and after it has spread. 
At least in the way that the narratives are framed, these are fairly standardised, 
universal responses which are ‘rolled out’ across the world according to plans, 
programmes, strategies backed up by protocols, manuals and regulations, and 
overseen by a technically-equipped and well resourced, benevolent ‘international 
system’. This universal, global vision is very much part of the contemporary rhetoric 
– and indeed frames the One World, One Health slogan. We are all in it together; 
we know how to deal with; it requires coordination and coherence.
Scientific interventions – and models of different sorts in particular – act to reinforce 
this framing. So computer models of disease spread for example show clearly how 
localised, at source eradication or containment efforts are critical in preventing 
a global pandemic. This justifies cross-border intervention, under the concept of 
‘responsibility to protect’ to use the current jargon89. But of course models are just 
models and dependent on often quite heroic assumptions – like diseases spreading 
in concentric circles, that borders of countries and districts don’t matter, that people 
are prevented from moving and so on. Surreptitiously and insidiously these ideas 
have an impact on policy framing, such is the power (and simplicity) of modelling. 
The 2005 models published simultaneously in Nature and Science (Ferguson et al 
2005; Longini et al 2005) probably had such influence. While all well qualified and 
perfectly rigorous in their own right, somehow their implications were extrapolated, 
framing policy in a particular way. Here was the outbreak narrative in its purest 
form, with an outbreak response lined up, all justified by science90.
As an epidemiologist, I keep looking for that pump handle solution. You know, what 
is that thing which is causing, mostly women, who are mostly the ones who raise 
chickens, to become infected, and then go on to negative outcomes, to die? What 
about the slaughter process?  What about the habit of picking the sickest bird in the 
group for the pot? And not being able to seek medical advice. The control might not 
actually be with birds, but at the human-animal interface that says how can I safely 
handle an infected bird? That may be an area that has gone under-investigated. 
Maybe we need to hit exactly where the ministries of health and agriculture meet91.
If the real risks exist “exactly where ministries of health and agriculture meet”, 
it may be that the response, focused as it is on separate narratives of human 
and animal health may miss the “pump handle”. And, surely, understanding the 
underlying drivers of disease change – and the socio-ecological dynamics of 
emergence – must be part of any international response. We assume that zoonotic 
disease ‘hot spots’ exist where natural reservoirs of disease from wild fauna are 
found close to usually rapidly growing urban conditions with intensive human-
animal contact, usually in settings where regulation and human health/veterinary 
services are weak or non-existent. Southern China is an example – as is Indonesia, 
Vietnam and much of south and south-east Asia, as well as urbanising Africa. The 
risks may be further enhanced with certain practices – consuming bush meat, 
living with livestock, shopping in wet markets and so on – and certain conditions 89 See http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/
90 The influence of models with some heroic assumptions embedded in them on disease policy 
debates is of course not new; see, for example, the UK foot-and-mouth policy debate in 2001 
(Campbell and Lee 2003; Kitching 2004).
But – and no-one denies this – it is not so simple. Complex disease dynamics mean 
that we don’t know what is going to happen when, and when outbreaks do occur, 
their pattern and impact is highly context specific. Such complexity is not amenable 
to simple outbreak models, and requires a deeper understanding of changing 
ecologies, demographies and socio-economic contexts – and, in particular, their 
interactions and dynamics in particular places. This field level understanding of 
dynamic contexts is startlingly absent in much of the work on avian influenza. Yet 
quite a lot seems to be known, even if it appears rather anecdotally in research 
papers and conversations. The vivid descriptions of the ‘viral soup’ in Qinghai 
Lake in western China, the migratory birds that carry the virus, and the increase 
in human-livestock interactions in rapidly growing urban centres, are startling. As 
one ecologist put it: “There is a whirlpool of genes re-assorting…It’s a dream for 
reshuffling of viruses. The lake is a soup of viruses”. But beyond some surveys, 
reproduced as multi-coloured GIS maps (a favourite form of presentation in this 
field – with red always being danger) (Pfeiffer et al 2007a, b; Jones et al 2008), 
and some recent work on duck-rice systems (Gilbert et al 2008), there has been 
remarkably little detailed socio-ecological investigation of the dynamics of change.
Given the potential threat and the resources being invested elsewhere in other 
activities, this seems remarkable. It of course relates to the politics of the policy 
process, and the individuals, organisations and professional interests that have 
captured the agenda. One informant commented: 
91 Interview, Washington DC, 13 June 2008.
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An outbreak narrative is an appropriate framing for those who do not live in these 
places and who want, for perfectly legitimate reasons, to protect themselves from 
any disease. But it is perhaps less so when seen from another perspective. In 
many settings in the developing world, people are used to living with infectious 
disease. They have deeply embedded ‘cultural logics’ (cf. Hewlett and Hewlett 
2007) that influence the way they understand and respond to diseases – of both 
animals and humans, and thus their constructions of risk. These may be at odds 
with standard medical and veterinary framings, resulting in disconnects between 
official programmes and local response. We found no sociologist, anthropologist or 
political scientist, for example, working on the avian influenza programmes of the 
major agencies. Yet there was a recognition that such perspectives were important 
in some quarters. In reflecting on the partial success of communications efforts, 
one informant commented:
This is where the anthropological, the cultural and the social come in. This means 
long term engagement rather than just communicating about the risk. These are the 
more complex and nuanced issues. 
Such a perspective, focused on the dynamics of disease and local responses, 
casts the agenda wider than the standard outbreak-treatment-eradication mode. 
Whole ecosystems and their complex interactions must be examined, and the 
social-cultural-livelihood interactions must be at the centre of both diagnosis and 
response. Given the way the current response has been framed, structured and 
financed, this may prove difficult. But such a perspective may have important 
ramifications for a One World, One Health perspective – in terms of disciplinary 
and professional skills, organisational arrangements, and identifying the focus for 
funding. This is discussed further below.
POVERTY, LIVELIHOODS AND EQUITY
A related narrative emphasises the distributional impact of disease burdens, rather 
than the disease per se. It points in particular to the impacts of diseases on different 
people, and also the impact of interventions. For, as we have already noted, avian 
influenza mostly affects poultry keepers in the developing world, many of whom are 
poor. The responses geared at a ‘global public good response’ – which are often 
designed to protect richer countries – have a disproportionate negative effect on 
poor livestock keepers. This inequality is at the heart of some of the major tensions 
over the international response. For those framing the problem as an emergency 
– and focusing on pandemic threat to humans – mass culling of chickens is seen 
as a necessary evil, which if compensated for, offers a substantial public good 
benefit. But looked at from the perspective of those whose livelihoods at least in 
part depend on these poultry, such an intervention can be catastrophic. Clearly the 
impacts will depend on where it happens and the alternative sources of income 
which might be available. Banning backyard birds in Thailand, say, has less of an 
impact, and causes less of an uproar than it does in Vietnam or Cambodia where 
economic and livelihood contexts are different.
There has been a range of excellent studies on the potential poverty impacts of 
avian influenza (both the disease and its control) by researchers linked to the 
FAO (Rushton et al 2005; Epprecht et al 2007; Roland-Holst et al 2008), as well 
as sustained commitment by the European Commission, the UK Department for 
International Development, among others to work in this area94. Studies document 
the distribution of poultry, the structure of the industry, the importance of poultry to 
livelihoods and the impacts of culling, market bans and so on. Findings all point to 
the importance of considering distributional impacts and equity in any assessment. 
This argument is picked up most forcefully by NGO campaign group, GRAIN, which 
makes the case that a ‘restructuring’ of the industry towards biosecure, large-scale 
units favours the large scale corporate interests which increasingly dominate the 
poultry industry globally. This has knock-on consequences for people’s livelihoods, 
food safety and animal welfare. This political economy of the food and farming 
industry, where politics and corporate interests define the shape of policy, is an 
area which, again, is obscured by the technical disease focus of the medicalised 
outbreak narratives. 
As Farmer (1996, 2001 and with Sen 2003) points out, structural inequalities 
define health policy and intervention and, as others point out, have done since 
the colonial era, when medical intervention and colonial conquest were very much 
part of the same project (cf. McLeod and Lewis 1988; Vaughan 1991; Arnold 1993; 
Anderson, 1996). An attention to the wider political economy of the international 
response to disease is therefore critical, and one that brings up sharp dilemmas 
and uncomfortable truths for narrower technical framings.
With avian influenza there is a slow realisation that it is no longer an emergency. It 
is a deep rooted issue underlying the disease. But this is very slow; and is resisted. 
It is more attractive to be doing something in emergency mode rather than investing 
in strategic thinking…Avian influenza to my mind is more a symptom of massive 
changes in the poultry sector globally. …there have been massive increases in poultry 
and duck production. An avian influenza was bound to arise. The question is how to 
improve the management of these sectors. Not just about the disease. Overall, we 
should be aiming for a framework for other viruses. If this one is not it, some other will 
be. But we are not there yet. Far from it.92
– notably poverty, malnutrition and immune system suppression (such as through 
HIV infection). In other words, these so-called ‘hot spots’ are not isolated places 
far from anywhere as the term might imply, but most of the developing world, and 
encompassing where most of humanity lives. As one informant explained:
92 Interview, UK, 11 March 2008.
93 Interview, New York, 9 June 2008.
94 See, for example: http://ec.europa.eu/world/avian_influenza/index.htm  and http://www.hpai-
research.net/index.html
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Again, the debate about poverty and equity – and the wider political economy 
questions associated – highlights the division between those with essentially a 
disease-focused framing of the problem and solution, and those who adopt a 
broader, normative development perspective. With a normative position central, 
we must ask: whose world, whose health, and which public, which good? It is 
not ‘just’ about controlling a disease, but asking where, for whom and with what 
distributional consequences. Gender dimensions, for example, are central, and 
important work supported by the European Commission highlights this (Velasco et 
al 2008)95. There are many within the actor-networks at the core of the international 
response who of course see these questions as central, and particularly country-
level projects and programmes are focused on just these developmental challenges. 
But sometimes this has been lost in the technical disease-focused response of the 
trio of global outbreak narratives. Given the mandates of the FAO – development 
through agriculture – or the WHO – improving human health – this is surprising, but 
witness to the strength and influence of certain framing assumptions and associated 
interests linked to the mainstream perspectives. However, as discussed further in 
section 11, if the One World, One Health banner is not just to be a glib slogan, 
representing an empty commitment to globalism devoid of politics, then these 
normative, political issues will have to be brought back in, requiring in turn, we 
suggest, a recasting of the outbreak narrative in some quite fundamental ways.
ACCESS AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
One of the assumptions of the three international response narratives described 
earlier (veterinary, public health and pandemic preparedness) is that everyone 
plays ball; that there is a global consensus on what to do and that this can then 
be implemented through an international architecture, based on the principles of 
cooperation and respect. This is essential to allow early detection, rapid response, 
viral change monitoring, timely manufacturing of vaccines and so on. A well-oiled, 
rules-based international machinery, with the UN technical agencies at the centre, 
is needed, it was argued by some of our informants. As a number commented, 
the overall level of collaboration and integration surrounding the avian influenza 
response has been remarkable when contrasted with dismal past experiences 
of cross-UN and development agency working. For some, the avian influenza 
experience offers a shining example of the potential of effective global governance, 
and the effectiveness of the International Health Regulations (Fidler 2005a; Fidler 
and Gostin 2006; Lee and Fidler 2007). 
But it only requires one spanner in the works and things get difficult for this idealised 
system. In this case the spanner came from Indonesia, at the very epicentre of the 
outbreak, and a strident minister of health, Siti Fadilah Supari. Her book, ‘It’s Time 
For The World To Change in the Spirit of Dignity, Equity and Transparency – Divine 
Hand Behind Avian Influenza’, together with a campaign facilitated by the Malaysia-
based campaign NGO, Third World Network, outlined the argument that sovereign 
rights should not automatically be ceded to the international system, and the WHO 
in particular96. Viruses from Indonesia should belong to Indonesia (even if they 
originally came from China), and that any benefits derived from using these – for 
manufacturing vaccines or drugs in particular – should result in benefit-sharing to 
the country of origin. The model was the recently negotiated International Treaty 
for Plant Genetic Resources, which was seen as a major victory by campaign 
NGOs and southern governments whose arguments about corporate bio-piracy 
had animated the debate97. 
In the context of the avian influenza response, a focus on access rights, national 
sovereignty and benefit-sharing rather took the WHO by surprise. Surely, the 
Indonesian government would want WHO reference labs to sequence the viral 
samples? Surely sharing of the virus and associated information would be to 
everyone’s benefit, even if a private company came up with a vaccine? Surely this 
is very different from seeds and crops? It soon became clear that this rather naïve 
response was inadequate. From beyond its walls the WHO was not necessarily 
seen as the benevolent protector of humanity’s health. Some saw the WHO as 
part of the problem – too under the control of northern commercial and political 
interests; in the pocket of big pharma and the US. Conspiracy theory or not, such 
a view can easily take hold. 
There has perhaps been a lack of recognition in the WHO and other parts of the UN 
system of changes in economic world order and the geopolitical consequences. 
Indonesia sees itself as an emerging regional power – a moderate muslim country 
which needs to be taken seriously. Rumour has it that Venezuela, Cuba and 
Iran were ‘whispering in Indonesia’s ear’ and encouraging its stance98, as it has 
been advocating the independent manufacture of generic anti-viral drugs and 
confronting the patents issues (Fidler 2005b). India argued that it could deal with its 
own avian influenza outbreak, and did not need external experts providing advice 
when their own capacity was sufficient99. And, since SARS, China’s role in the 
whole international response has also been a focus of debate, with reporting and 
engagement with the international system being less than consistent.   
With the refusal by the Indonesian government to supply human influenza virus 
samples or data to the international system in early 2007, the assumptions of the 
international governance system were put firmly to the test. High level meetings, 
diplomatic negotiations, behind-the-scenes deals and much media speculation 
characterised months of tense relations, culminating in a meeting held in March 
2007 at which a deal was more-or-less brokered100. Wider discussions around 
95 See: http://ec.europa.eu/world/avian_influenza/docs/gender_study_0608_en.pdf
96 http://www.twnside.org.sg/announcement/Joint.NGO.Statement.on.Influenza.Virus.Sharing.htm
97 http://www.fao.org/ag/CGRFA/itpgr.htm
98 http://www.scottmcpherson.net/journal/2007/8/1/singapore-meeting-might-return-us-to-those-
thrilling-days-of.html
99 http://www.bio-medicine.org/medicine-news/WHO-Commends-Indias-Bird-Flu-Response-8125-1/
100 http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2007/pr09/en/index.html; see also Nature (2006a);(2006b)
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the access to research data, and the establishment of the OFFLU network (the 
joint OIE-FAO network of expertise on avian influenza) by Dr Ilaria Capua101 have 
sent strong signals about the importance of transparency. Commitments are now 
in place for transparent sharing of data and virus samples, and an initial global 
influenza virus tracking system has been launched by the WHO102. But the test will 
be in the practice, particularly if a pandemic emerges.
The lessons from this episode are less about the mechanics of virus and information 
sharing than the political consequences, and the implications this has for visions 
of global governance. The WHO’s position at the centre of the network has to 
be earned, and respect and recognition of new important economic and political 
players must be part of this. As one informant observed:
The virus sharing controversy was a shock. WHO is old style, not transparent. People 
are not impressed by symbols any more. Even the Red Cross. They are not impressed 
by doctors and big organisations. This is a good thing, but problems arise103.
Another observed:
That is a very delicate one… the issue of IHR and sharing of information is really, 
really critical…when we are talking about a world that is so interconnected I think 
it’s difficult to use the word sovereignty in areas where there is a potential for spread 
beyond boundaries104.
Another reflected:
It [the virus sharing issue] has been very awkward. WHO has been seen to be at fault, 
as far as member states are concerned. So it is difficult for WHO to intervene. It is an 
unusual situation…Yes, the system did need overhauling. For 50 years people did not 
realise that viruses got shared, and handed on to pharma companies…But the issue 
was not brought forward in a way that the multilateral system is able to deal with105.
The broader reconfiguration of the geo-politics of health policy has ramifications 
across the policy process. A focus on access and rights – particularly for those who 
had not normally been at the table, notably big pharma and northern governments 
– suggest another important reframing of the debate making the simple formulations 
of ‘global governance’, and the associated slogan of ‘One World, One Health’, 
more difficult to realise than perhaps was first envisaged.
101 http://www.offlu.net/organisation.php
102 http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/aivirus_tracking_system/en/index.html; although 
the effectiveness of the deal was being questioned, see: http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-
english/2007/August/20070813131101lcnirellep0.6877405.html
103 Interview, Geneva, 5 March 2008.
104 Interview, New York, 9 June 2008.
105 Interview, Geneva, 5 March 2008.
All of these alternative narratives are being actively debated within the organisations 
at the core of the international response actor network. But they are to date 
having limited purchase on the mainstream outbreak narratives. However, as the 
international avian influenza response continues to unfold, the consensus is always 
open to disturbance, as the virus sharing controversy dramatically showed. At the 
end of this paper we will return to the suggestive implications of these alternative 
narratives, and explore what they imply for a programmatic definition of the One 
World, One Health agenda in terms that move beyond simplistic globalism and the 
outbreak narrative. 
8. ORGANISATIONS AND INSTITUTIONS 
The avian influenza response involves a huge array of institutions, initiatives, 
programmes and projects. Acronyms fly in a bewildering mix. AHIF, AHITF, CFIA, 
CIDRAP, CMC-AH, DFID, EC, ECDC, ECTAD, EMPRES, EPR, FAO, GAINS,GF-
TADS, GIS-AID, GLEWS,GOARN, GPAI, IPAPI, JICA, , OIE, OFFLU, PAHO, 
PHRD, PIC, SFERA, UNICEF, UNSIC, USAID, USDA, USCDC, WFP, WHO, 
WIC and many, many others are all involved in the international response – and 
many have been created by the new in-flows of funds106. There is much political 
positioning, turf warfaring and squabbles over mandates and funds, as we have 
seen. But this is normal practice, largely to be expected when something big 
and new arrives on the horizon, especially when attached to large amounts of 
money. The key question must be: is this evolving institutional and organisational 
architecture the most effective and efficient – and does it improve resilience, and 
the ability of the world to respond to new, uncertain, surprise-laden events? This is 
a more open question. 
106 AHIF Avian and Human Influenza Facility; AHITF Avian and Human Influenza Task Force; CFIA 
Central Fund for Influenza Action; CIDRAP Center for Infectious Disease Research & Policy, 
University of Minnesota; CMC-AH Crisis Management Centre for Animal Health; ECDC European 
Centre for Disease Prevention and Control; ECTAD Emergency Centre for Transboundary Animal 
Diseases; EMPRES Emergency Prevention System for Transboundary Animal and Plant Pests 
and Diseases; EPR Epidemic and Pandemic Alert and Response; GAINS Global Avian Influenza 
Network for Surveillance; 
GF-TADS Global Framework for the Progressive Control of Transboundary Animal Diseases; 
GIS-AID Global Initiative on Sharing Avian Influenza Data; GLEWS Global Early Warning and 
Response System for Major Animal Diseases, including Zoonoses; GOARN Global Outbreak 
Alert and Response Network; GPAI Global Program for Avian and Human Influenza Control and 
Preparedness; IPAPI International Partnership on Avian and Pandemic Influenza; OFFLU OIE/FAO 
Network of Expertise on Avian Influenza; PAHO Pan American Health Organization; PHRD Policy 
and Human Resources Development (World Bank-managed Japanese Trust Fund); PIC Pandemic 
Influenza Contingency; PVS OIE Performance, Vision and Strategy; SFERA Special Fund for 
Emergency and Rehabilitation Activities; UNSIC United Nations System Influenza Coordination; 
USCDC United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; WIC World Influenza Centre.
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We quickly reach the limit of our system. We need expertise in the corridor to recognise 
what is going on. Surveillance is very different between countries: Indonesia and 
Nigeria for example. For the latter, there were no reports in September. In Indonesia 
they are looking and finding it. But again we are tracing events, not the situation in 
the country. Reporting in X is very poor. If they report, it’s because everyone already 
knows. The key question, when it gets serious, is the high level of expertise we need 
in the corridor. It is more and more difficult to find good people107.
Thus judgement and local expertise remain key, and this is where the system 
sometimes falls down. Reluctance by veterinary services to report outbreaks, 
or farmers in fear of the consequences; the lack of field staff in-country and 
poor understanding of underlying epidemiological dynamics, all add to an air of 
uncertainty despite the fine coloured maps and interactive websites. Several people 
noted that most of some islands of Indonesia are covered in red dots (outbreaks) 
because there is an intensive, and very expensive, disease search presence there 
funded by the US. But as one informant put it: “This doesn’t mean that those bits 
of Indonesia that are blank, or other parts of the region that are not plastered with 
red dots, do not have the disease – just look at the map, it doesn’t make sense”108. 
This realistic and honest assessment points to the basic problem of surveillance 
– if there is poor trust in veterinary services, or if field-level capacity is weak, then 
reporting is going to be patchy. The maps in many cases report, not the overall 
pattern of outbreak, but the intensity and capacity of surveillance efforts.
In order to gain some insights into this, we start with a closer look at the surveillance, 
information, prediction and early warning infrastructure which has been built – or 
in most cases extended – across the core organisations. Accurate surveillance, 
timely information, useful prediction and clear early warning are critical for any 
response – for avian influenza or any other epidemic. Time and accuracy is 
everything. Consequently this has been a focus of much investment in this area. 
Staff numbers associated with the ECTAD (Emergency Centre for Transboundary 
Animal Diseases) group at FAO for example have expanded from less than ten to 
around 200 in just a few years as a direct result of avian influenza investments. 
This group collates information from a range of sources and assesses the spread 
of animal diseases around the world. Linked to the OIE reporting system, where 
CVOs must report to Paris any notifiable animal disease, and the public health 
surveillance system coordinated by WHO, the ECTAD group make regular updates 
and assessments to help focus the international animal health response. However, 
those working there are realistic about what such a system can and cannot do. 
107 Interview, Rome, 1 February 2008.
108 Interview, Rome, 1 February 2008.
On the human health side, things are a bit more straightforward. Hospital reporting 
tends to be reasonably accurate, and diagnosis is straightforward if samples are 
sent to a lab. But of course not every case presents at a hospital, and not all 
hospitals and clinics will send samples, although the severity of HPAI in human 
The internal risk assessments are heavily based on expert opinion. We don’t have 
the data to say these are valid variables. Our experience is what matters. We look at 
anecdotal things – the likelihood of reporting and so on; stories about the hiding of 
information – people who went to the doctor but did not say they had poultry. There 
is more risk where people are hiding. It cannot be quantified though. The long term 
goal is to validate the variables, ideally with FAO. But now it is expert opinion and 
many uncertainties…For example, in some places there is lots of viral circulation, but 
little exposure because of well constructed wet markets. But in other places it is the 
opposite. We can say – if you want to lower risk you can do this or that. Yes, we would 
love to do it on a local basis, but the data is simply not there. We realise that things 
are different in different parts of a country. Look at China! How can you look at Tibet 
and Guangdong in the same assessment?113
109 http://jech.bmj.com/cgi/content/abstract/62/6/555
110 http://www.who.int/zoonoses/outbreaks/glews/en/index.html
111 http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/media/nr-rp/2004/2004_gphin-rmispbk-eng.php; http://www.
promedmail.org/pls/otn/f?p=2400:1000; http://www.gideononline.com/
112 http://www.who.int/csr/outbreaknetwork/en/
113 Interview, Geneva, 7 March 2008.
114 This was the case with a rift valley fever outbreak in Sudan for example in November 2007, 
see: http://www.who.int/csr/don/2007_11_05/en/index.html
cases and the level of at least reported mortalities is very high109. The WHO 
system involves data collection from a wide range of sources, including official 
reporting. The GLEWS network (the Global Early Warning System for Major Animal 
Diseases, including Zoonoses, a WHO-FAO-OIE partnership)110 includes scans of 
media reports and websites for early indications. They make use of the Canadian 
Global Public Health Intelligence Network (GPHIN), which includes media and 
internet searches across several languages, and the ProMed reporting system, 
along with the Global Infectious Diseases Epidemiology Online Network (GIDEON) 
database111. In addition, there are ‘outbreak hotlines’ which people can contact 
– an email address (with a blackberry which is reputedly responded to around 
the clock) and a phone number. There are also inputs from informal reports by 
WHO field officers, members of the GOARN (Global Outbreak Alert and Response 
Network)112 teams and others who are contacted when suspicions are aroused 
(Heymann and Rodier 1998, 2001, 2004). Information is one thing, but verification 
is another. Formally this has to be through notification by national governments’ 
health ministries – or designated WHO contact people – confirmed by lab tests, 
initially locally, and then in WHO reference labs. But such verifications can be slow 
in coming, and WHO personnel, particularly specialists in the influenza must make 
their own assessments. As one informant put it: 
Thus, as with some other zoonotic diseases, early information often comes from 
human reporting, rather than assessments of the animal health situation114. This 
is worrying, as catching things early and spotting and eradicating major avian 
outbreaks quickly is seen as central to the wider public health response. In practice, 
we have a situation in a number of countries where the avian disease is entrenched 
and occasional human outbreaks are treated – although in a large number of cases 
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the patient dies. Monitoring this situation, however, for signs of any pandemic 
pattern remains key, and so investment in surveillance systems is a top priority 
– across human and animal settings.
A central challenge for zoonotic diseases is thus to coordinate surveillance across 
animal and human populations. As discussed, disparities in information quality and 
accuracy make this difficult, but across the international system there is a working 
attempt. This involves daily morning tele/videoconferences between the WHO 
and FAO emergency centres (the SHOC room in Geneva and the CMC in Rome), 
with interactions intensified with OIE and others when new outbreaks are defined. 
There is clearly an effective, collegial interaction across the agencies, helped by 
a few key individuals who have experience across the human and animal health 
areas. By all accounts this works well – and in many people’s eyes this represents 
unprecedented coordination and integration, helped along by funds to be sure, but 
also by a committed set of professional individuals. 
But the surveillance case presents some important organisational dilemmas. 
First, there is the question of coordination from local settings to global information 
systems. This is often not effective, especially where capacities are weak and 
suspicions are rife at the local level. As one informant put it: “What has been done 
does not follow a clear plan. There are overlapping mandates, rivalries, lack of 
clarity, unsustainability. There has been fudging of solutions”115.
This relates to wider politics of information, and fears that supplying potentially 
sensitive information will have negative consequences. This applies to farmers 
clearly, but potentially also to national authorities who fear heavy-handed intervention 
in their affairs from outside, legitimised by human health issues and the IHR of 2005. 
As Calain (2007a, b) cogently points out, at the heart of surveillance activities there is 
often a clash of mandates and expectations, with international agencies potentially 
at loggerheads with national authorities. With global public health and wider security 
agendas deeply intertwined, the politics of surveillance is highly contentious. Such 
wider political tensions are compounded by more basic administrative and capacity 
issues at local level, with front-line health professionals resisting new surveillance 
efforts as they see redundancy and overlap in activities and competition for time, 
attention and budgets. As Calain (2007b:19) concludes, there is little doubt that the 
profusion of surveillance efforts “is essentially geared to benefit wealthy nations”, 
making suspicion, reticence and low levels of commitment understandable.
Second, there are professional, disciplinary and organisational divides that affect 
the cultures and practices of day-to-day activity. Vets and medics do not always have 
the same perspectives, as we were told repeatedly in our interviews. As someone 
put it “there is that distinction I think that somehow treating the animal is less…yes, 
less noble, than treating people. So you just wait for the people to get infected!”116.
The thinking between vets and medics is really, really separate. It’s challenging. 
That is a big one to overcome. It assumes there is no crossing over. The minds are 
still that way, even if they are working on something like avian influenza. We have 
to overcome these challenges. Everything is a problem. Human doctors think it’s a 
human disease. But they have to be reminded it is an animal disease! On the animal 
side, they forget the human element…There is this huge diversity of thinking. The lab 
bench people get along quite well. But getting others in the room…that’s hard. When 
people do get together, people tend to have very political discussions. We need better 
technical collaboration117.
115 Interview, Rome, 30 January 2008.
116 Interview, Washington DC, 13 June 2008.
Another observed: 
Another commented:
There is mistrust between the two castes – the doctors and the vets. It has prevented 
lots of collaboration. There is a slight complex of inferiority among the vets. And there 
is a big complex of superiority among the medics118.
This affects the way interactions are conducted, and only when personal interactions 
take over do such difficulties die away. This is compounded by different interpretive 
styles, ways of assessing information and evidence and ways of framing responses. 
Yet, while difficult to pinpoint, medics and vets see outbreaks in different ways: 
a single case of a human may be enough to spark a reaction, yet thousands of 
chickens must die before anyone really notices. And in response terms vets have a 
wider range of actions at hand – birds can be culled, movements can be restricted 
and treatment enforced, whereas for humans draconian interventions are all a bit 
more difficult. 
Third, there is the tricky question of what information is made public, what is kept 
quiet and how things are presented. This was a subject of some discussion with 
informants in both WHO and FAO. While there are plenty of outbreak maps and 
alerts, these have to be understood with caution, as we have already discussed. Are 
these presenting an accurate picture of risk or do they represent, in fact, substantial 
ignorance and deep uncertainties? One informant recognised the responsibility of 
her position: “Yes, we come up with numbers. But I won’t let anyone see them. It’s very 
dangerous to release such numbers”. Thus, despite all the technical paraphernalia, 
and scientific protocols and procedures, there are after all human beings at the 
centre of information systems. They must make judgement calls: inevitably they 
black-box uncertainties, ignore some data, and emphasise others. This is based 
on expertise and experience, which is why they have the job. But this inevitably 
carries its own biases – personal, disciplinary, institutional. Here the ‘outbreak 
narrative’ and an emergency framing of the response often comes into play, and 
events (outbreaks, infection cases, mortalities) are emphasised over processes, 
and the less tangible, less easily recorded dynamics of slow spread or endemism. 
117 Interview, Geneva, 7 March 2008.
118 Interview, Geneva, 5 March 2008.
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Finally, there is the response to risk information and early warning alerts. Who 
believes it? Who wants to believe it? In studies of early warning systems in other 
fields (cf. Buchanan-Smith and Davies 1995), a ‘missing link’ between early warning 
information and response has often been found. As, if there is scepticism about the 
information, fear about the consequences and uncertainty about everything, it is 
not surprising that some calls are not heeded. This puts pressure on those handling 
information, constructing maps and presenting statistics to up the ante: fear and 
danger is always a good spur to action, it is thought. This may help, but it may also 
undermine – as people either panic or laugh at exaggerated statistics.  
This look at the surveillance infrastructure highlights a number of important 
features of the disease response architecture today, as well as some important 
dilemmas. The emphasis on cross-border responses, and the international 
dimensions of epidemic responses are clearly significant. Disease and health is no 
longer just a national concern. The IHR make this very clear. Ceding sovereignty 
in the face of global threats is an important wider discourse in foreign affairs and 
international relations thinking today. Is there a global ‘responsibility to protect’ 
– to intervene where sovereign processes are failing, on behalf of ‘humanity’? 
Are rights universal, and therefore to be upheld universally through international 
jurisprudence and institutions? And does this all give excessive power and influence 
to international institutions, whose lines of accountability and forms of governance 
can be questioned?
And how should such a global response be organised? Amongst the grand talk 
of international responsibility, universal rights and humanitarianism there are 
some more practical concerns. We have inherited a set of institutions designed 
for a different time and a different set of purposes. The modernist, humanitarian, 
developmental mission of the UN looks sometimes a bit outdated given the growth 
of new powers, the influence of transnational capital, philanthropic funding and the 
type of challenges and threats faced today. The UN’s accreted structures look creaky, 
inefficient and expensive to many, and often grossly ineffective. Simon Maxwell 
for example, argues that “the international system is clunky, unrepresentative and 
out of date”, that there is “system failure”119. In a similar vein, a UK government 
submission to the July 2008 House of Lords Select Committee report noted how 
“the current architecture is crowded and poorly coordinated. Within the diverse 
group of organisations there is no agreed vision or clarity over roles”120. 
Much of this relates to the cumbersome governance structures of the UN agencies. 
With national governments as members, and with political appointments, often 
without the relevant technical expertise, of permanent representatives through the 
organisations, it is not surprising that national or regional bloc interests sometimes 
119 Developments Magazine http://www.developments.org.uk/articles/system-failure
120 Diseases Know No Frontiers: How effective are Intergovernmental Organisations in controlling 
their spread? http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldselect/ldintergov/143/143ii.pdf, 
Para 92, page 34.
overshadow global, strategic goals. A long-term squeeze on core finances, certainly 
of FAO and WHO, means special-interest politics meets stark economics in the 
running of these organisations. With the coffers filled through project funds, often 
with an ‘emergency’ label, it is easy to see how strategic directions get diverted 
and organisational dysfunction emerges. Similar challenges are faced by the non-
UN, inter-governmental organisation, the OIE. Here governments are represented 
through technical specialists, usually the Chief Veterinary Officer, so policy-making 
is dominated by the special interests and concerns of the veterinary profession, 
rather than political concerns. Clearly, none of these arrangements is ideal and, 
for the case of the avian influenza response, they have clearly presented some 
significant obstacles.
These kind of complaints, and the resulting agenda for UN reform, have of course 
been around for decades, but there are many voices arguing for a new international 
institutional architecture today. In a major speech on foreign policy delivered in 
Boston in April 2008, UK Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, argued how a total rethink 
of the international architecture was necessary for today’s problems. Such views 
are echoed by many others, not least US Presidential candidate, Barack Obama121. 
The often tetchy relationship between the UN and the Bretton Woods institutions is 
at the centre of this, together with the relationships between these global institutions 
and the new conventions, protocols and regulations that have emerged to provide 
for ‘global governance’. Does the system need a total overhaul, almost a starting 
from scratch, or is the current international architecture broadly ‘fit for purpose’ but 
in need of a few teaks and revisions?
The international response to avian influenza was perhaps a test case for this 
debate. Did the international system adapt effectively and perform well, or is it 
in need of some major reworking? Informants we talked with had diverse views 
– scattered along a spectrum. Several were very positive. One commented: 
Avian influenza has seen some of the most effective coordination between international 
agencies I have ever encountered… people will ask: what did it all achieve? There 
was no pandemic. But that surely is one big tick. We also can say that we looked at 
all sorts of things in new ways, and put money into veterinary systems, standards, 
disease surveillance, PHC [primary health care] services and so on. These are all 
good and useful things122.
121 http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page15303.asp http://www.cgdev.org/doc/blog/obama_
strengthen_security.pdf
122 Interview, London, 25 January 2008.
123 http://www.fao.org/pbe/pbee/en/219/index.html
Everyone agreed that positive lessons had emerged. In the area of animal health, 
issues of confused mandates and overlapping responsibilities had been raised 
by a recent, highly critical, external evaluation123. This questioned why the OIE 
and the FAO Animal Production and Health Division seemed to be doing similar 
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things, and argued for a clearer separation with a recapturing of the development 
agenda by the FAO, leaving the standard animal health policy matters to the OIE. 
Some went further and argued for a merging of the two into a single organisation 
to improve coordination and effectiveness, avoiding the on-going turf wars and 
overlaps. This analysis was, not surprisingly, rejected by those within the OIE and 
FAO who pointed to their distinct mandates and effective coordination, especially 
around avian influenza. As one informant put it: “[despite the criticisms], all the FAO 
has to do right now is shout avian flu, and people will shower them with money!”124 
And they had a point: once early squabbles subsided, the working relationship 
has been relatively smooth and improving, and substantial funds followed. Another 
informant suggested: “We are now just a normal dysfunctional family!”125 
A more radical assessment voiced in a few quarters was that there is a need 
for a new organisation which focuses explicitly on zoonotic emerging infectious 
diseases, and brings together vets, medics and communication specialists under 
one roof, allowing surveillance systems, information and early warning, regulatory 
arrangements, capacity strengthening, scientific research and broader policy 
frameworks to become integrated and aligned in one set-up. This has a logical 
appeal. However, most of our informants (of course many with vested interests in 
some form of the status quo) rejected such a scenario. Many pointed to what they 
felt were the failings of UNAIDS126. One informant told us: “We did not want to make 
an institution like UNAIDS. We wanted to make something that could vaporize in a 
puff of smoke; that could create space for others.”127 
The formula adopted for the avian influenza crisis did not go down ‘the UNAIDS 
route’, but involved a lighter-touch coordination group based in New York. The office 
of the UN System Influenza Coordination (UNSIC), within the UN Development 
Group, was established, as discussed earlier, at the direct request of the Secretary 
General, likely with lobbying from the then DG of WHO, Dr Lee Jong-wook. The 
assumption was that this would provide a coordination, profile-boosting and fund-
raising function, which would have direct links to WHO in Geneva, which, it was 
assumed, would take on the main implementation activities, as this was framed at 
that point very much as a public health pandemic threat. 
This of course did not happen, and for good reason. The veterinarians, while slow 
to get going by many accounts and being ‘poor at politics’, were soon accepted 
as important players. And because of the Japanese funding deal, UNICEF was 
brought into the fold. Much to the resentment of many in the UN system, the 
World Bank was brought on board too (it had first formed a bank wide team in 
October 2005, and had a major seat at the first international conference in Geneva 
124 Interview, London, 25 January 2008.
125 Interview, Rome, 30 January 2008.
126 See the recent independent evaluation: http://www.unaids.org/en/AboutUNAIDS/
IndependantEvaluation/default.asp
127 Interview, London 27 February 2008.
in November), with a special trust fund established to manage grants and loans. 
The World Bank, it was argued, brought different expertise and capacity to the 
table – offering both an overall economic development outlook and transparent and 
accountable funding mechanisms which were easy to manage and report on. One 
Bank insider commented:
The Bank had something to offer, but it was intangible. Sometimes it was knowledge, 
sometimes it was just to bring a bit of order in a process where people had really 
strong technical views and needed a little help to put it together…The Bank is good at 
cross-sectoral, institutional issues, looking at things from an economic perspective and 
avian influenza touches so many different sectors… But the Bank can be portrayed 
as a non-technical agency strutting about telling everyone what to do. We’d say we 
are just articulating a framework that can be supported financially. But there’s a fine 
line between setting up the architecture and pushing everyone inside the building and 
telling them they have to live there128.
David Nabarro, who was given the job as Senior UN System Coordinator in 
September 2005, proved a brilliant networker and facilitator. While different people 
have (very) different views about his role, all acknowledged his political acumen 
and energy129. UNSIC then became a focal point, envisaged by those inside as 
facilitating a ‘movement’ within and beyond the UN:
128 Interview, Washington DC 12 June 2008.
129 Examples of positive commentaries included: “David Nabarro was a great factor in raising the 
funds. He is very effective at loosening the purse strings. UNSIC is a real focus for the effort and 
policy. David’s tub thumping speeches helped raise the profile” (Interview, London, 25 January 
2008); “The role played by UNSIC has been very significant. You have someone that can network 
and pull people together so easily, this is something that we need to better understand how we can 
use this model in the future for coordination. It is a coordination function and also an energising 
function, and one that ensures communalities are shared… there’s been the recognition that there 
are quantifiable merits with the model - cost is miniscule and the benefits are extremely significant, 
but it requires a mandate.” (Interview, New York, 9 June 2008). There were detractors too: “UNISC 
is now becoming irrelevant, that’s my personal view, but communications between agencies is now 
better, even if UNSIC is not co-ordinating it.” (Interview, New York, 9 June 2008). See also Cheng 
and Nabarro (2006) and the recent evaluation of UNSIC (Willitts-King, Smith and Sims, 2008).
130 Interview, Geneva, 7 March 2008.
The relentless efforts by David Nabarro have kept things moving. The Action Plan 
was an attempt at a coordinated approach: 12 agencies. It had never been done 
before. A great achievement, it created bridges. WHO is now being harassed by other 
organisations to allow them to get involved…All agencies now want to be involved 
– tourism, migration, civil aviation etc. Everyone wants to be involved in global health 
issues. This is good. It breaks down barriers. Even if UNSIC stops something will be 
left behind. A movement has been created130.
This framing, which avoids models of a fixed, permanent organisation, is interesting 
and strategic. The focus was on facilitation, on ideas, on getting people talking to 
each other, on building bridges sometimes over huge gulfs – and raising money. 
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Normally I am sceptical, not excited about what we do. Here we are doing something 
important. Long term. This is a process that will mark a period of history…There is 
a need to be flexible, so that people can pull institutions with them. Not very much 
has been formalised… It is an interesting moment. We have been lucky: 15 - 20 
committed individuals made the difference131.
UNSIC did a very good job, bringing organisations closer together, defining tasks for 
the core organisations, getting the issue onto the political agenda in many countries. 
Now, three years further on, I am not so convinced of the added value of UNSIC, 
trying to get out of coordinating and into a leading role. This is not their job - they 
should be leading with agenda setting, defining priorities, with the World Bank132.
The movement metaphor provided UNSIC with a vision and mission – in the 
system, yet outside; cooperating, yet challenging. There was genuine excitement 
and enthusiasm: this was the future.
The sense of personal connection and commitment was apparent too. As someone 
closely involved reflected: “It wasn’t enough to say here is something for the global 
public good. We first had to build relationships”133. Others commented on the way 
a network was built:
They got to know each other too. You get a community of involved people… Everybody, 
everybody is there. The main donors, the countries, US, Japan, the European 
Commission, the UK, Canada, Australia, in terms of the very active ones. And then 
the main organisations - OIE, WHO, FAO. They are all on first name terms now134.
131 Interview, Brussels, 4 March 2008.
132 Interview, London, 13 May 2008.
133 Interview, New York, 9 June 2008.
134 Interview, Washington DC, 12 June 2008.
Several years on, there are widely divergent views on the UNSIC experience. Some 
argue that this is a model for the future of the UN, and should be central to any UN 
reform strategy. It allows coordination across agencies – and, critically, beyond the 
UN – it allows funds to flow efficiently and be properly managed, and it allows the 
technical agencies to do what they do best. Others disagreed. They saw gradual 
‘mission creep’ and interference in what should be technical mandates of technical 
agencies by those who did not know what they were talking about. They saw funds 
being managed by the World Bank trust funds and not them, and, they argued, 
a reduction in core funding to the technical agencies which became increasingly 
reliant on short-term loan based funding from World Bank managed sources. 
And they saw competition for power, prestige and authority. As agency mandates 
moved to the centre they became more politicised and controlled. Whether this was 
just sour grapes of insightful analysis is difficult to tell, but the debate has certainly 
influenced the policy process. UNSIC remains key, but its future – or the future of 
similar cross-cutting coordinating bodies – remains up for debate.
The avian influenza response has therefore raised some fairly fundamental issues 
about organisational arrangements and institutional architecture at the global level. 
The coherence and coordination, though flawed, found at the global level, is not 
matched at the local or national level. This problem is particularly acute in more aid-
dependent countries, where projects, programmes, strategies sometimes trip over 
each other. Apparently in 2005, Vietnam had almost 800 donor missions in one 
year135. One informant commented: “In Cambodia there are 22 donors active in the 
health sector. There are over 200 NGOs also and 109 projects.  You can imagine 
how useful it would be if everyone could work in a coordinated way”136.  In the 
context of UN reform debates, and discussions about organisational change more 
generally, these are familiar issues. The prospect of a one-stop-shop approach to 
country-level delivery by the UN may, in these circumstances, have many merits137, 
yet substantial challenges remain on the ground138. Much of the impetus for a 
coordinated response to avian influenza indeed came from demands at the country 
level. However despite the successes, some major challenges for the future are 
pointed to.
First are strategies for managing overlap in mandate and function to ensure 
efficiency and coherence, resulting in ‘optimal redundancy’ for ‘high reliability’. 
In highly complex dynamic situations, where surprise and uncertainty is always 
present, designing neat organisations that can respond to all possible circumstances 
is impossible – and probably dangerous. It is necessary to accept a certain 
messiness, which inevitably involves a level of redundancy, to ensure that a ‘high 
reliability organisation’ (Perrow 1999; Weick and Sutcliffe 2001)139, with enhanced 
system resilience, can respond to the inherent uncertainty. In addition to some 
level of redundancy, important design features include: flexible organisational 
architecture, a commitment to experimentation, learning from failure, continuous 
reinvention as adaptive response, prioritising anticipation as well as resilience, and 
lines of authority which are clear and simple. In many respects, by default rather 
than design, core aspects of the current avian influenza response system do mirror 
some aspects of these features. What is needed is to enhance these further.
Second, as already discussed, coordination across technical areas, agencies 
and functions has been a major issue. This is a critical feature of the response 
to any zoonosis, whether avian influenza or others. Here there is a huge array 
of organisations involved. As one respondent put it: “We are working with our 
135 Comment by S. Tyson from DFID,in: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/
ldselect/ldintergov/143/143ii.pdf, para 150, page 52.
136 Interview, Washington DC, 11 June 2008.
137 See details on the ‘Delivery as One’ pilot projects at: http://www.undg.org/?P=7 and the High 
Level Panel report of November 2007: http://www.undg.org/archive_docs/9021-High_Level_
Panel_Report.pdf and http://www.un.org/events/panel/
138 The country-level studies which are currently being completed explore this issue from the 
standpoint of different country experiences, including that of Vietnam, a pilot ‘One UN’ country. 
See http://www.steps-centre.org/ourresearch/avianflu.html
139 http://www.highreliability.org/index.html
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international partners, both NGOs and international agencies and that’s hard. 
‘Herding cats’ is the phrase we are using”140. The role of UNSIC – and the IPAPI 
group – have been important, but there have been blockages and constraints to 
joint working, although many have been at least partially undone over time. One 
informant complained:
There is collaboration and it is useful but you’d be surprised at the looks of horror when 
you say - wouldn’t it be a good idea if every time you had an animal case someone 
rang up the human health people so you could send out a team together and check the 
people too. At the big meetings…what inevitably happens is that WHO makes a little 
speech, FAO makes a little speech, David Nabarro makes a little speech, and OIE too, 
who maintain their vigilant independence from the UN system…This sends the wrong 
message. The whole effort, the whole ethos of this has been to coordinate, to integrate. 
Yet when we get to tell the world how well we work together, we do it individually! 141 
Whether there needs to be more integrated organisational arrangements to 
bring things together is a much disputed point, but certainly more joint working 
and collegial interaction across divides is needed, as many informants agreed. 
For example, Jakob Zinsstag from the Swiss Tropical Institute argues for a more 
integrated system of local level para-veterinary and para-medical support for 
Africa142 and others have made the case for integrated training systems, such as 
joint veterinary and medical schools143. And, in the wider pandemic preparedness 
challenge, the set of players becomes even larger. One informant said:
The focus has to be not only the human and animal health side, but also these other 
elements in terms of pandemic planning, some other elements of society...Now when 
you look at FAO, they are not going to sit there and say ‘my biggest concern is the 
continuation of the financial services sector’. It requires a bigger picture.144
140 Interview, Washington DC, 11 June 2008.
141 Interview, Washington DC, 11 June 2008.
142 http://www.sti.ch/datensatzsammlung/newsletter/newslettermarch08/onehealthzinsstag.html
143 This is an example of one the few cases of this sort of initiative: http://www.vetmed.vt.edu/
news/vs/oct05/index.html#dvmmph
144 Interview, Washington DC, 11 June 2008.
Third, is the issue of mandate and responsibility. Currently mandates are largely 
technically defined, and present major technical, professional and disciplinary divides 
as we have discussed. These can be real obstacles to effective working, as they 
perpetuate some basic misunderstandings and prejudices; and such divides can be 
reinforced by personalities, fiefdoms and territories. The avian influenza response, 
just as any other internationally coordinated activity, has resulted in some major 
‘big men’ problems, where personality clashes have soured relationships. Many of 
these divides have been over ownership and control of particular technical areas, 
and so funds and authority. Bringing the ‘two castes’ of vets and medics together 
in particular, but also, we would argue, social scientists of various sorts, must be a 
major challenge for the future, although challenging to achieve given institutional and 
professional histories. This may require some basic re-thinking about training (joint 
vet/medic schools or courses), re-skilling (social scientists with understandings of 
epidemiology and technical scientists with social science skills), and professional 
incentives (for joint working, publishing across sectors and disciplines and so on), 
and job descriptions/recruitment strategies (vets in WHO, and medics in FAO 
or OIE, for example, with social scientists in all organisations). One informant 
pointed to the biases in the professional advice systems as currently structured:
One of the problems is that within veterinary advice systems, the core advisors are 
nearly all lab vets, not epidemiologists for example. These are the chief technical 
advisers in governments and agencies. The focus is on diagnosis and detection of 
the disease agent. This is seen as the most important thing. This is a limited view 
when the disease is in a population – and the population exists in a social context…
The lack of epidemiological and economic skills is very frustrating. The specialists 
that exist know the exact changes of amino acids in the virus, but nothing much else. 
The bigger picture is lost145.
Fourth, there have been some important lessons about funding: raising it, 
managing it and spending it. A joint approach, across agencies, to raising funds 
has clearly been a major success (or was for a while). Major pledging events, 
even if expensive, add profile, and attract senior figures. Over 1,000 people turned 
up for the Beijing pledging conference, including more than 50 ambassadors and 
ministers, from over 100 countries. This large and diverse attendance allowed 
funding agencies, and the bureaucrats involved, to pitch for funds from pots that 
might not otherwise exist. The high political profile of avian influenza, particularly 
following US President Bush’s September 2005 speech, meant that emergency 
funds, not just development funds, started to flow. Consequently the amounts far 
exceeded those that would be realisable under normal budget envelopes. Spending 
so much money efficiently and effectively – and on time, however, is not easy. The 
World Bank trust fund mechanism proved a useful approach, although some argue 
that this diverted funds away from core activities in the technical agencies. One 
well justified complaint, however has been that funds have tended to end up with 
the core agencies and not with national governments. In a reflection on progress so 
far, the technical meeting held in Rome in June 2007 concluded candidly that:
Contrary to the stated intent in Beijing to ensure that the majority of funding was 
made available directly to countries in support of their national avian and human 
influenza programmes, analysis of recipients of funds indicates that less than half 
of total funding is going to countries; so far non-national recipients such as regional 
organisations and the United Nations are the main recipients of the funds that have 
been disbursed146.
145 Interview, UK, 11 March 2008.
146 Food and Agriculture Organisation (2007c) http://www.fao.org/docs//eims/upload//232772/
ah668e.pdf (para 5.1b, page 29).
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This highlights the problem of disbursement. While coordination may have been 
at least partially effective at the international level, it has rarely been so at country 
level. This has made project funding in the field difficult, and integration even more 
so. As mentioned before the type of funds also made a big difference. Many of the 
funds were earmarked ‘emergency’ funds on short time frames, requiring a rapid 
spend; others were loans through the World Bank system, and so carrying with 
them the potential for debt; and many were ‘soft’ project funds, providing plenty 
of cash, but only over short periods and without the overhead to invest in core 
support. The result has been a projectisation of activity which has resulted in some 
unfortunate overlaps, high transactions costs and an expansion of staff on short-
term, consultant-style contracts, without longer term institutional commitments.
 
Finally, there is the question of monitoring and learning approaches and systems 
of accountability. UNSIC has provided an invaluable function of collating data and 
providing updates on activities and expenditures. The December 2007 report is in 
many senses exemplary, cutting, as it does, across so many fields and activities 
and involving so many people and resources147. To get a bird’s eye view (so to 
speak) of the avian influenza response the report is clearly the first port of call. For 
donors and others this reporting provides an important level of accountability. But 
how much has this been just a data collation exercise, based on often unverified 
data sources, and not one that enhances more fundamental reflection and learning 
on the basis of experience? These systems seem to be less in place. The real-time 
evaluation of the FAO went through several iterations before a useful document 
emerged. Some of its key findings were then rejected by the management (notably 
the recommendation to appoint a dedicated operations manager)148. While allowing 
a detailed, forensic look at performance and practice in real time, the evaluation 
did not seem to generate much reflection and learning – more animosity and 
defensiveness. Indeed, donor influence had a lot to do with this. As one participant 
in the evaluation explained:
The US said: ‘we are only interested in containment’. This was the US rep with a 
prepared statement. ‘Get the big cannons out! Throw everything at it!’ That Iraq 
thing again. And they are by far the biggest donor…The US context is that avian 
influenza is a bio threat! Keep it out of the US! It’s secondary that people are dying 
elsewhere. But FAO is obliged to deal with the wider picture. Livelihoods. Trade. FAO 
is a development organisation obliged to deal with these things149.
In the end it is difficult to know what is being monitored against what and for whom. 
Most activities to date have been aimed at assuring donors that money has been 
spent well. But measures of impact and effectiveness – and focal points around 
which learning needs to be emphasised – have not been identified; and if they 
147 http://www.undg.org/docs/8097/12-18-07-UN-WB-AHI-Progress-Report-final.doc and
148 http://www.undg.org/index.cfm?P=52 
149 http://www.fao.org/pbe/pbee/en/index.html (see both main report and management response)
  Interview, Rome, 30 January 2008.
have been they tend to be sectorally bound, relating to a particular framing of 
response. A bigger questioning of effectiveness, efficiency and boosting resilience 
– and particularly the distributional effects (who wins, who loses) have not been 
investigated. This breeds a complacency that might have spilled over into some 
of the ‘forward look’ discussions around the ‘One World, One Health’ agenda. 
We would argue that a more searching reflection on ‘framing assumptions’ (or in 
monitoring and evaluation language, ‘theories of change’) is needed, and one that 
brings in other voices and perspectives to create a wider basis for accountability, 
beyond that required by donors. We will pick up on this theme in the conclusion.
In the end of course, it is difficult to assess whether the organisational architecture 
that has evolved for the avian influenza response, incrementally, often chaotically 
and with many flaws, has worked well or not. We have not had a pandemic: that 
may be an indicator of success, or not. Yet, the virus has spread over a large part 
of the world, and has become endemic in a number of countries where continuous 
outbreaks occur. More than two billion chickens have been slaughtered as a result 
of the interventions galvanised by the international response, with major impacts on 
businesses, markets and livelihoods. A number of new systems have been put in 
place – surveillance, information management, early warning, public communication; 
and human health and veterinary services have been strengthened in some places. 
Are we therefore better prepared, more resilient than before? No-one knows.
A fear of the unknown of course feeds into a set of concerns about ‘security’ which 
are at the heart of the debate about avian influenza. These security discourses, 
however, require some unpacking in order to understand their impact on the politics 
of the policy process. This is the aim of the next section.
9. SECURITY DISCOURSES
As we have seen, the wider political forces – particularly in the US, but also in 
the EU, Australia and Japan – push for a set of responses that emphasise the 
protection of healthy rich northern populations: the virus must be kept out. Yet it is 
realised that a simple fortress approach may not work. John Barry points out that 
the 1918 pandemic probably originated in an army base in Kansas. As a senior 
WHO official put it: 
150 Interview, Geneva, 5 March 2008.
With dense populations, large amounts of virus increases the likelihood of a pandemic. 
But a pandemic could start in a developed country. The Americans assume it will 
happen elsewhere and the job is to keep it out. But it could start there. When can we 
say we are prepared? Never is the answer150.
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So, no-one is safe, anywhere. It requires a global response to an unknown threat 
in order to keep ‘the homeland’ safe. And it requires a concerted effort that goes 
beyond the vets and medics, and narrow professional concerns, to an emphasis 
on global systems that protect people and economies from huge mortalities and 
dramatic collapse. This is central to the pandemic preparedness narrative discussed 
in section 6; but it is important to go further and identify the idea of ‘security’ 
as central. 
After 9/11, it is not surprising that such discourse has emerged around the potential 
for a pandemic. The threat of pandemic influenza is apparently graded higher 
than terrorist attack in the US in terms of national security (Barry 2004). Keeping 
the virus out of America, and dealing with it at source has been seen as a major 
priority by the US administration. The US state department, for example, makes 
the rationale for such investment absolutely clear151. Broader international efforts 
are of course linked, and the establishment of IPAPI (International Partnership on 
Avian and Pandemic Influenza) offered an informal inter-governmental approach to 
pushing agendas and coordinating funding, outside the UN system.
Much of this debate in the US presents a particular version of national security, 
linked to political, public and electoral concerns in the wake of 9/11 and Hurricane 
Katrina, not about disease control per se and certainly not about issues of poverty, 
equity and development. With health and foreign policy so intertwined152, and avian 
influenza concerns being seen as part of ‘homeland security’, the imperative to 
protect national interests often trumps global concerns in the US. 
The US has been important. It has been taken very seriously here.  It’s all linked with 
post 9/11 contingency planning, and Hurricane Katrina. There was a realisation that 
the country really needed to get itself organised for this sort of event153.
151 See the January 2006 report to Congress, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/59025.
pdf as well as the main Department of State site, http://www.state.gov/g/avianflu/. Also see: http://
www.pandemicflu.gov, http://www.state.gov/g/avianflu, http://www.usda.gov/birdflu, http://www.
hhs.gov, http://www.cdc.gov and http://www.usaid.gov.
152 See discussions in: Fidler 1999, 2003, 2004; Katz and Singer 2002; Ingram 2005; Owen and 
Roberts 2006; Kickbusch et al 2007.
153 Interview, New York, 10 June 2008.
154 http://www.foresight.gov.uk/OurWork/CompletedProjects/Infectious/Index.asp; executive 
summary: http://www.foresight.gov.uk/Infectious%20Diseases/E1_ID_Executive_Summary.pdf
In the UK, the Foresight report ‘Infectious Diseases: Preparing for the Future’154 
spun a vivid ‘Out of Africa’ narrative about the threats of emerging diseases 
from the developing world. Interventions that then followed aimed to check this 
flow, and reduce this threat. Health planning around avian influenza in Europe 
and North America is very much seen in this vein, with Departments of Health 
working with civil contingency units and homeland security branches, in, for 
example, the US State Department or the UK’s Cabinet Office155. Risk registers, 
covering all perceived risks to health and security are compiled and reviewed at the 
highest level. 
Discourses of security have of course intersected with concerns about health and 
disease for a long time. Close associations between disease control and colonial 
conquest have been widely discussed (cf. King 2002), as have investments by the 
military in research on infectious diseases, particularly relating to the tropics where 
troops might serve, or where source material for bioterrorism could emerge (Khardori 
2006). This organisational and institutional architecture goes beyond the core public 
agencies discussed in the previous section. Thus, US investments in the high security 
foreign animal disease lab at Plum Island have largely been driven by homeland 
security concerns156. Major conferences on bioterrorism, and no doubt extensive, but 
classified, policy discussions have occurred in the past years, with avian influenza 
being a focus for attention157. With defence and homeland security spending less 
constrained than that for veterinary or public health, these concerns have had 
significant effects both on the framing of the debate and the funding of responses. 
But there is not one single framing of security. Historically, different versions have 
been evident (Hinchliffe 2007: 105, citing Collier and Lackoff 2006). From the 
seventeenth century in Europe, a national security paradigm became dominant, 
co-constructed with the emergence of monarchical states. Such states had 
sovereign territory, with borders defended by military force. Such a national, 
state-based military security discourse has persisted, and is the basis of much 
thinking about state-making and international relations to the present. In the late 
nineteenth century, another version of security was added. This focused on the 
security of populations, and in particular their health. This saw the rise of public 
health interventions, based on new epidemiological knowledge about the spread 
of disease. Population security, first at the level of the nation, and later, with the 
advent of the WHO in 1948, at the global level, became an important strand of 
security discourse, often intersecting with the national-military security perspective 
in important ways. In more recent times, a third version has appeared, focusing 
on ‘vital systems security’. Here the focus is less on nations or populations but 
more on the systems and routines that keep economies and societies ticking; and 
We were told: 
155 For the UK, see the UK Resilience site: http://www.ukresilience.gov.uk/pandemicflu.aspx and 
the link to the Civil Contingencies Secretariat of the Cabinet Office; for the US, see: http://www.
pandemicflu.gov/
156 See the 2002 Wall Street Journal article at: http://www.ph.ucla.edu/epi/bioter/
bioterrorismplumisland.html
157 In the US, the 9/11 Commission Act required a national biosurveillance system to be set up to 
counter bioterrorist attack. See the July 2008 report of the US Government Accountability Office, 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08960t.pdf. CIDRAP has a long list of resources on bioterrorism, 
as well as frequent news updates and links to conferences and meetings on bioterror in which 
avian influenza is frequently cited, see: http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/bt/bioprep/
index.html. Also see the long list of sources on the US Environmental Protection Agency site on 
‘agroterror’: http://www.epa.gov/oecaagct/thom.html 
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The medical and defence establishments think in very similar ways. Doctors and 
nurses are the new army, and vaccines are the new weapons. This is a very different 
view of health security158.
The population-based public health security discourse is clearly very evident too, 
and central to the WHO response – and indeed much of the argument for the 
veterinary response too. Classic epidemiological arguments define populations ‘at 
risk’, and health security aims to protect them – and protect them from affecting 
others. And finally, ‘vital systems’ security discourses are very prevalent, particularly 
in the pandemic planning narratives and the civil contingency responses that have 
developed. 
But, because of the pliability of the term, and its high political and policy status, 
‘security’ language and thinking has permeated the debate. The meanings and 
implications of the use of the ‘S’ word, however, are not always clear, allowing 
it to be captured at one moment by a national-military tone, and at others by a 
more benevolent population and vital systems perspective. With security so central 
to the wider policy discourse, this slipperiness is both understandable, but also 
dangerous. A quick look through documentation on avian influenza sees security 
associated with a range of different terms – global, homeland, national, civil, 
population, system, health, bio, food, human, livelihood, personal and more. Again, 
we need to ask: whose security, against what, for what end? This is often not clear. 
Funding politics may, in the end, dominate, as a version focused on ‘homeland 
security’ or ‘bioterror’ trumps other interpretations. 
A wider debate about public health and foreign affairs is related – and, in particular, 
how another slippery term ‘global health governance’ is being defined (Fidler 2007 
a, b).  But there are perspectives on security beyond those that currently dominate. 
preparedness for emergencies. This has been key for much of the security and 
civil contingency planning around terrorism, as well as so-called natural hazards 
– earthquakes, floods or diseases. A whole professional discipline of disaster 
planning and management, now given more urgency by global climate change, has 
emerged focusing on making ‘vital systems’ more resilient and allowing adaptation 
in the face of shocks or stresses.  
The avian influenza response is interesting because the different outbreak narratives 
which dominate mainstream policy thinking cut across these different, historically-
situated versions of what is meant by ‘security’. With the emphasis on ‘homeland 
security’ and bioterror, an old-fashioned national security agenda is central. This is 
extended by thinking that emphasises global security responses across borders, 
and the associated slogans such as ‘responsibility to protect’ (even though these 
measures are essentially to protect national territories and citizens of particular 
nation states). As one informant put it: 
158 Interview, Geneva, 5 March 2008.
These relate more closely to the alternative narratives on avian influenza, which 
have also been sidelined to date, but which may offer approaches to global health 
governance and security that are currently not on the table. So for example, the 
March 2007 Oslo Declaration of Foreign Ministers from Norway, Brazil, France, 
Indonesia, Senegal, South Africa and Thailand identified human security as an 
important framing for the global health debate159. A follow-up symposium identified 
a wider agenda for ‘health diplomacy’160. Here issues of equity, poverty and 
development come to the fore, echoing the ‘human development’ perspective of 
UNDP. A wider concern with ethics and civic concerns was also highlighted in the 
July 2006 Bellagio statement. This emphasised issues of social justice, and more 
bottom up, citizen led responses, focused on basic rights161.
As with the disease and responses to it, there are different framings of governance 
– and notions of ‘security’. The international avian influenza response has adopted 
a variety of perspectives, often reflecting particular national political and policy 
interests. Thus the US response has been very much centred on ‘homeland 
security’ – protect ‘us’ from ‘them’ at source, going beyond national borders. 
The European perspective has similar elements, but given its largely continental 
context, with a steady flow of avian influenza virus into mainland Europe from the 
Balkans and beyond, there has to be a less worried tone. The actions of European 
member states has also shown a determined focus on effective control, along with 
the European Commission’s commitment to a wider developmental angle to the 
global response, building on the experience of responding to the tsunami162. There 
are other perspectives too – such as those who signed up to the Oslo Declaration 
– which frame governance and security more in terms of basic human needs and 
rights. And, as we saw in section 7, there is perhaps an emerging and assertive 
Asian perspective which argues that access, control and rights must be more widely 
shared, that having everything geared towards northern – and especially American 
– public anxieties, political concerns and capitalist interests is simply not equitable.
 
The IHR 2005, discussed in section 5, defined a new form of multilateral response 
to international health issues, very much framed in terms of assuring global health 
security. A balance between sovereign states and individual country membership 
of international organisations like WHO and global responsibility must be found, it 
argues. This means that sometimes, for the greater global good, international action 
is required. But, as we saw, the IHR 2005, while allowing greater scope for action 
159 http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/about_mfa/Minister-of-Foreign-Affairs-Jonas-Gahr-S/
Speeches-and-articles/2007/lancet.html?id=466469
160 For the ‘Foreign Policy and Global Health Initiative symposium, see: http://www.who.int/trade/
symposium/en/index.html; see also Margaret Chan, DG of WHO on health diplomacy: http://www.
who.int/dg/speeches/2007/130207_norway/en/index.html
161 http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/bioethics/bellagio/index.html. Other work, including the citizen 
engagement in pandemic influenza pilot project, as well as a range of reports on ethical issues 
from WHO, the Board on Global Health, the Institute of Medicine, the US Centers for Disease 
Control and others are included at: http://www.who.int/ethics/influenza_project/en/index1.html 
162 Interviews, March, June 2008. http://ec.europa.eu/world/avian_influenza/index.htm
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in theory based on a new vision of transparent consensus-oriented globalism, has 
limits in practice. What will China announce, or not; which virus samples will be 
shared; and can big pharma be made to play ball? These are tricky questions at the 
heart of the challenge for global governance, and ones that have no easy answers. 
Currently there is an uneasy international consensus on global health security and 
its implementation, and a range of agreed legal instruments and institutions. Yet 
there are, within these diverse framings of ‘security’ which are largely dominated 
by the perspectives of the currently more powerful countries, attempts to recapture 
a more equitable, less hegemonic version, focused on human securities, ethics 
and rights. These again ask: Whose world? Whose health? And suggest a different 
shape to politics and the political economy. As the debate moves forward, and 
other players become more assertive, the cracks and fractures in the current 
consensus may become clearer, requiring deeper deliberation of what we really 
mean by global health governance and security.
For, we argue, the big questions about what to do and where in any international 
response to an emerging disease, as highlighted so vividly by avian influenza, mean 
that different types of governance arrangements will be required, with different 
framings of security. It is this recurring feature of deep uncertainty and ignorance 
that we want to probe in the next section. Does ‘the emperor’ of the international 
response have any clothes – or evidence-based backing for the response – and 
how do understandings of risk and uncertainty get dealt with by experts and others 
in constructing the response?
10. DOES THE EMPEROR HAVE ANY CLOTHES? 
RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND EXPERTISE
Central to any understanding of an epidemic is expertise. But the nature of that 
expertise and the authority it carries has huge consequences for the way public 
policy is designed. Evidence-based policy is the contemporary mantra, but what 
evidence is used, and what is ignored in the development of public policy? And in 
what ways is such knowledge and evidence framed? These are important questions, 
derived from a constructivist stance to science and policy. This does not mean that 
we are arguing for a relativist perspective where anything goes, or some type of 
conspiracy theory where evidence has been hidden or results somehow fiddled. 
But we are arguing for a more critical look at the underlying basis of constructing 
arguments that influence policy – the context and practice of science and policy, 
the framing devices used, and the way data are presented and terms used. This is 
of course a major study in its own right and we can only touch the surface. 
However, as the previous sections have highlighted, there are huge uncertainties 
evident (where the likelihoods of possible outcomes are not clear), and not a little 
ignorance (where we don’t know what we don’t know). Some perspectives have 
not been prominent in the policy debate, while others have taken centre stage, 
linked with powerful people, organisations and money. Thus a study of knowledge 
in policy is also a study of power – and the construction of discourses and practices 
in particular contexts163.
Such knowledge politics are played out in particular around major uncertainties 
and areas of ignorance. In the past sections, we have seen a variety of examples 
relating to causal mechanisms (viral change, reassortment and genetic dynamics), 
spread in animals (ducks, wild birds, trade), incidence (estimates of viral load, 
the cyclical, inter-annual and seasonal patterns, and the prevalence of ‘endemic’ 
settings), transmission (and the likelihood of human-human transmission), impact 
(on mortality rates of wild birds, domestic poultry and humans), and response 
(efficacy of bird culling, vaccination and so on in different settings). 
Such uncertainties – or areas of ignorance – are of course widely recognised in the 
scientific and policy advice community164. One informant summed it up thus:
It is difficult to deal with potentially catastrophic risk, where you cannot establish the 
risks... It’s like having an insurance policy which cannot guarantee to pay out and there 
is no way of pricing the premium. This is not a traditional infectious disease problem. 
The normal approach of vaccine or treatment is difficult. We are talking of highly 
contingent risk, where it is very difficult to deal with the economics of response165.
163 Following Foucault (1997), we can see the unfolding of the avian influenza response as a study 
in biopolitics and biopower, where actors and associated networks exercise power and control 
through processes of framing, and practices of categorisation, ordering and governmentality (cf. 
Rose 2006).
164 Although often framed in terms of ‘risk’, cf. Dowdle (2006).
165 Interview, London, 25 January 2008.
166 Interview, Brussels, 3 March 2008.
Another commented from a different perspective:
Children dying in east Turkey – of course everyone gets scared… But no one can 
say H5 is more likely to cause a pandemic than H7. Both are quite dangerous. In one 
case handled well with media; the other was an explosion. The first challenge is this, 
we don’t know, we must be open. My personal line - I’ve studied virology - is not to 
emphasise that this virus will cause a pandemic, but we must be honest. We never 
know with this type of virus166.
In scientific articles margins of error and coefficients of variation are of course 
quoted. Yet the framing of the core ‘outbreak narrative’ responses has been, as we 
have seen, around probabilistic risk – and an emphasis on prediction and control 
– and not a more central admission of uncertainty and ignorance. This we argue 
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is problematic, even dangerous. Look at virtually any policy statement or position 
paper on avian influenza and the well-used statistics on potential mortalities are 
trotted out. For effect these tend to be at the high end of the spectrum. Despite 
the qualifications and conditions attached, these statistics are the ones that get 
picked up in the media and in popular treatments – in the growing library of books, 
magazine articles and op-eds on the issue – as well as in ministers’ briefings and 
policy proclamations. This is natural and not surprising. There is no conspiracy 
involved – and indeed they may be right. Better to be cautious and plan for the 
worst than use uncertainty or ignorance to do nothing: “if you accept the premise 
that some things are beyond the reach of science, that doesn’t prevent us from 
taking actions”, argued one informant167.
 
How do such framings arise? As we have seen, there have been intense political 
and bureaucratic pressures – with commitments from the President of the US 
downwards pushing the process. There has been a jockeying for position and 
funds in the policy debate that followed, with headline grabbing an important tactic. 
And there have been the workings of science advice itself within and between 
organisations involved in the avian influenza response. This is where, we suggest, 
the light needs to be shone more brightly. For in the processes on-going within 
the WHO, FAO, OIE, UNICEF, the World Bank and the rest, science and policy 
is inevitably mutually constructed. Science does not neatly feed into policy in an 
unproblematic and linear way, nor do politics and policy simply dominate science. 
There is a two-way traffic. But sometimes technical ‘truths’ are not fully questioned. 
One non-technical outsider commented:
The major technical premises, on which the [global] strategy was developed, 
were never clearly articulated or well explained. That’s true for things like culling, 
vaccination, compensation…no one seems to ask stupid but hard questions, like why 
are we doing this in this way when before we were told that vaccination is no use? 
Or why are we culling in countries where the virus is endemic, because that hurts a 
whole load of small farmers and doesn’t stop the infection spreading? So why are we 
sticking to a system that doesn’t seem to make a whole lot of sense?...The lack of 
uniform technical advice has been a problem - especially in-country. The agencies 
can contradict each other. If there is a division on the technical advice it’s very difficult 
to design projects168.
The outbreak narratives we have discussed fit neatly into both the scientific and 
policy cultures involved. The science, as we have seen, has been dominated by a 
particular type of medical and veterinary perspective, reinforced by emergency and 
humanitarian response approaches. This emphasises disease events in particular 
places, and the imperative to control and eradicate. Policy then responds in 
particular ways that are well suited to bureaucratic routines and funding protocols. 
Thus the political and organisational settings for science advice and policymaking 
act to exclude alternative framings, focusing instead on a particular set of outbreak 
narratives as the core response. This process of mutual construction – which, 
as we have emphasised before, is not necessarily ‘wrong’ – acts to black-box 
uncertainty and denies forms of ignorance, and other perspectives that are difficult, 
awkward and just don’t fit. The mainstream knowledge framing is thus around ‘risk’ 
– something that can be measured– and the response, risk management – through 
surveillance, early warning systems and treatment and control strategies, where 
known, measured risks are minimised. 
But this is only part of the story. What happens when we don’t know outcomes or 
likelihoods? What happens when there are alternative framings of impacts and their 
consequences? As we have seen above, for avian influenza this is most of the time, 
for most situations. Here a narrow version of risk assessment is inadequate. Figure 
3 offers a diagrammatic representation of this argument, distinguishing between 
different types of incertitude across two axes – knowledge about likelihoods and 
outcomes. It also highlights (in the arrows) the cognitive, procedural and institutional 
pressures that influence a move towards the top left hand corner, and a focus on 
a narrow approach risk assessment, and away from a more plural response to 
different types of incertitude; something, we argue, would be more appropriate for 
the avian influenza response.
Figure 3. Responses to incertitude (from STEPS, 2008 – unpublished mimeo, 
originally from Andy Stirling)
167 Interview, New York, 9 June 2008.
168 Interview, Washington DC, 12 June 2008.
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Unfortunately, as we have seen, in the avian influenza response the choice of 
metrics and indicators, as well as institutional pressures to define ‘harm’ or ‘liability’ 
in particular ways, move us from an acceptance of ‘ignorance’ to definitions based 
on uncertainty, where knowledge about outcomes are deemed less problematic. 
In the same way, foresight exercises or scenario plans move arguments to policy 
assessments where knowing the likelihood of an event appears to improve, 
although debates persist about outcomes. In this way, scenarios, horizon scans 
and wider public deliberation always throw up multiple options – and so ambiguity. 
Which one to choose? Wider agenda-setting processes and political imperatives 
– for action and certainty - often force closure around particular options, often 
without much further evidence, moving the analysis ever further towards the 
top-left corner, where knowledge about likelihoods and outcomes are deemed 
unproblematic, and amenable to risk management. This narrow risk framing is in 
turn reinforced by certain types of modelling which use probability estimates (or 
often actually informed guesswork) to move from uncertainty to a probabilistic risk 
assessment mode. Again, there are institutional and procedural pressures for this 
move: risk maps, decision models and insurance policies require such probabilistic 
assessments: fuzzy, complex uncertainty or ignorance just will not do. 
All these moves are reinforced by a set of disciplinary cultures which value 
quantitative, disease-focused assessments over more complex analyses of social, 
economic, political and ecological dynamics. In Rosenberg’s terms, the explanations 
are centred on ‘contamination’ not ‘configuration’; on outbreak events not complex 
disease dynamics. Understanding these disciplinary and professional biases needs 
to be at the heart of any analysis. A reconfiguring of disciplinary expertise and an 
involvement of alternative knowledges, including that of those directly affected by 
the disease, could, as we have suggested earlier, have a dramatic effect on the 
framing of the problem and the response, allowing alternative narratives into the 
picture. This would help to bring to the fore real uncertainties, ambiguities and 
forms of ignorance, and push policy to respond to these explicitly, rather than 
wishing such awkward, troublesome dimensions away. 
However, as it stands, a fairly standard, narrow risk framing – centred on three 
outbreak narratives – dominates the avian influenza response. This, as we have 
shown, emerges from a range of institutional, procedural and cognitive pressures, 
and not necessarily from ‘evidence’ per se. Science and policy is mutually 
constructed in a particular context that acts to include and exclude through the 
exertion of power through a range of institutional and professional practices. As 
previous sections have discussed, the three outbreak narratives we have outlined 
focus on a ‘risk framing’ (top-left corner), with often top-down, formulaic, ‘at source’ 
interventions following from it, backed up by a variety of mechanisms that claim 
to predict and provide risk-based assessments of early warning. These types of 
response are, as we have shown, reinforced by a set of biases which lie at the 
heart of response systems (and the agencies that oversee them): disciplinary, 
procedural, administrative, bureaucratic, organisational, funding, political, and 
more, as well as the public policy context within which such responses are 
manufactured, notably the role of the media, public trust in expert institutions and 
the political imperative to be seen to be doing something in an era of anxiety, worry 
and perceived threat.
But does this matter? Many reading this will perhaps respond – well of course, 
that’s true, but so what? We would argue that it does matter, and that a narrow  risk 
framing that does not effectively acknowledge issues of uncertainty and ignorance 
– and the ambiguity of alternative interpretations of likelihood and outcome, can 
act to narrow our assessment and response in ways that may undermine the 
effectiveness and resilience of responses. 
How might this happen? For example, by focusing too much attention on (well 
acknowledged) inadequate information, surveillance and early warning systems, 
we may miss important shifts in disease ecology, and so we may be caught 
by surprise, with serious consequences. Alternative ways of thinking about 
surveillance might not have so much focus on reporting disease events and so 
constructing purported risk measures, but more on understanding of complex 
ecosystem change and holistic assessments. This may, in the end, result in better 
responses. Similarly, recognising the ambiguities, and inherent politics between 
different outcome scenarios may allow more concrete deliberation in policy circles 
around alternative, normative consequences for different options. In other words, 
asking who will be affected, where and with what implications for poverty? Such 
distributional questions associated with different disease responses should be seen 
as central to any discussion of policy, but tend to get occluded from the analysis by 
a universal risk framing.
In the final section we will outline some of the implications of what we define as a 
‘dynamics and distribution’ approach to tackling the ‘One World, One Health’ agenda 
in relation to some of the key avian influenza and pandemic threat intervention 
pathways. This section has highlighted how expertise and framing is central to such 
an endeavour, and being explicit about what we do know and what we don’t, and 
indeed being alert to the fact that we don’t know what we don’t know, is vital if a more 
resilient response system to new disease threats is to emerge. The current default 
of a narrow risk framing – even with all the qualifications – we argue is potentially 
dangerous, blanking out as it does through a range of discursive, institutional and 
cognitive moves important ambiguities, uncertainties and forms of ignorance. 
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11. ONE WORLD, ONE HEALTH?
CHALLENGES AND IMPLICATIONS
The One World, One Health agenda is certainly ambitious, combining animal, 
human and ecosystem health in one all-encompassing approach. For some this is 
far too big and unwieldy, potentially undermining the successes of the focused avian 
influenza response by trying to put too much into the pot. As one informant put it: 
“It’s a good catch phrase, but I am not sure what it means”169. Another observed: 
These concepts need to be narrow to be viable. One World, One Health is cast to 
cover everything. It sets the imagination off but it is more important to work out what 
is viable than come up with grand concepts. Avian influenza was a ‘brand’ if you like 
that could make a number of things happen. It allowed us to focus on something that 
was a tangible threat and source significant amounts of money from contingency 
funds. Talking about generic threats at the human-animal interface - zoonoses - is 
less arresting and makes it harder to draw funds down. The link with a possible 
human pandemic has focused things significantly170.
For others, it is unquestionably the way forward, requiring a radical rethinking of the 
way we respond to international health questions. An enthusiast put it thus:
What it [the avian influenza response] has done is wake the world up to the fact 
that large numbers of [new human] diseases - 75% of them - come from the animal 
kingdom. And the connections between animal health and human health are much 
more apparent I would argue now, than they were five years ago. People have seen 
the connections with SARS, ebola. This has really accentuated that171.
The big danger, everyone agrees, is if this simply becomes a repackaging exercise: 
a desperate attempt to grab funds on the tail-end of the avian influenza bonanza 
by creating something that looks new. One cynic commented: “You’ll probably find 
that it was at one time called veterinary public health; it is in fact nothing new”172. 
The incentives for the default option are large. There are vested interests in what 
has become a status quo – well funded avian influenza programmes, propping up 
large groups of staff on short-term contracts, and mini-empires which have pushed 
certain departments and individuals into prominence. And many argue, with some 
justification as we have seen, that the avian influenza response has been successful 
and offers a good model for rolling out similar approaches to respond to a wider set 
of potential disease threats.  
169 Interview, New York, 9 June 2008.
170 Interview, New York, 10 June 2008.
171 Interview, Washington DC, 11 June 2008.
172 Interview, Washington DC, 13 June 2008.
We argue, however, that if the ‘One World, One Health’ agenda is to have any traction, 
it must not simply be old wine in new bottles, no matter how enticing the prospect 
of new cash for activities that are fast running out of funding might be. Despite 
the tangible successes of the recent international response to avian influenza, we 
believe there are some important lessons that have been learned that require some 
fairly important shifts. In particular, by questioning the dominance (but not not the 
importance or the relevance) of the three ‘outbreak narratives’, we argue for an 
opening up of the overall framing to encompass the three alternative narratives 
– on veterinary and animal health issues, on human public health and on pandemic 
preparedness – discussed in section 6. This then requires new perspectives 
on appropriate organisational architectures, the understanding of ‘security’ 
and responses to uncertainty and ignorance, as sections 8 to 10 have argued. 
Here we identify ten challenges for the way ahead derived from our analysis. Again it 
should be emphasised that, by arguing for change, in most instances we are not arguing 
against existing approaches, but arguing for additions, extensions and nuances. 
MANAGING ENDEMIC SITUATIONS
As sections 4 and 5 highlighted, much of the current veterinary and public health 
response is framed by a strong ‘outbreak’ narrative that emphasises the disease 
event and the diseased area. A response strategy follows that focuses on disease 
eradication. This is clearly desirable, and an emergency/crisis response is of 
course appropriate in many areas. But in other places it is not: the ‘model’ response 
is not appropriate in all contexts. And these areas may be significantly larger and 
more important – for overall global disease dynamics – than originally thought. In 
areas where the disease is heavily entrenched, and effectively endemic, a different 
approach may be needed. This focuses on long-term prevention and managing 
endemism, rather than emphasising eradication pathways which may either be 
impossible or, worse, result in more rather than less disease because of the 
consequences of intervention measures.   
EMBRACING UNCERTAINTY
As discussed in section 10, there are a variety of factors  embedded in the current 
response that result in the black-boxing or ignoring of uncertainty and ignorance, 
and the denial of ambivalence (or alternative perspectives). These are reinforced 
by institutional practices and the nature of expertise. But a simple risk framing – 
and risk management response – may not be enough. An approach that embraces 
uncertainty (and ignorance and ambivalence) may result in more effective and 
resilient response strategies. But this requires new forms of expertise, a more open 
approach to assessing evidence and designing responses, and new methods and 
practices to allow this to happen. This is a theme that cuts across all other areas, 
with profound consequences. 
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RETHINKING SURVEILLANCE
The ‘outbreak’ focus discussed above lends itself to a particular type of surveillance 
emphasising tracking disease events. This is essential and represents the basis of 
significant and important investment over recent years. But this, we argue, needs to 
be complemented by ‘systemic surveillance’ that looks at the dynamics of changing 
diseases and ecosystems, identifying triggers, dynamic shifts and potential new 
equilibria, as a range of variables in non-linear systems interact. Clearly this is 
a much more difficult task and would need a combination of broad ecosystem 
assessment with modelling work, and – critically – locally based information 
systems which pick up on local understandings of dynamic change. Surprise will 
always be present, but understanding complex dynamics may help us prepare for it 
in ways that are more comprehensive than often after-the-event disease tracking.
A FOCUS ON ETHICS, EQUITY AND ACCESS
Much of the current debate has been framed in universal, global terms: this is 
a global threat requiring a global response. The One World, One Health banner 
can be seen in these terms too. But just beneath the surface – and occasionally 
popping above it to disturb the neat global consensus – are issues of equity and 
access. Choices of what to do, where and for whom (whose world, whose health?), 
inevitably frame and direct the pathways of response. If dominated, as to date, with 
largely northern concerns about ‘health security’, then a response pathway will 
emerge in a particular way (around the outbreak narratives we have discussed). 
But with other framings – say around poverty, equity and access – then a different 
response pathway will be more likely. Across this report, and reflecting the views 
of a number of many we discussed with, we have identified a more developmental 
focus as key for any future agenda. This emphasises not just ‘global’ health security 
and governance in a bland, universalist sense, where the politics of access and the 
structural inequalities inherent are obscured, but an agenda where this political 
economy is very much more central. This will require an explicit analysis of the 
social distribution of risks and rewards, as well as new voices at the table, resulting 
in a more inclusive approach to agenda setting. It will allow some agencies at the 
heart of the response – and in particular the FAO and WHO – to recapture some of 
their core mandates, and focus attention more explicitly on these issues.
A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON HEALTH SECURITY
This relates to a wider debate about the meanings and interpretations of ‘health 
security’ and ‘health governance’. As discussed, these have come to mean certain 
things, excluding other perspectives. This has happened almost by default through 
the unfolding of the policy process and the capture of the agenda by particular 
interests and perspectives. The global consensus – some would say fudge – has 
avoided debating these sensitive and highly charged topics, particularly as the 
major funders of the international response have very strong views. Unless a more 
thorough debate is conducted, this consensus will remain fragile and subject to 
disturbance. Alternative perspectives on security, particularly at the global level, 
need to be engaged with, including those developed under the auspices of the 
Oslo Declaration. A different vision of the relationship between health and foreign 
affairs may yet emerge, which the One World, One Health initiative could be a 
good vehicle for. This may offer a reinvention of the concepts of health security and 
health governance in ways that are less framed by post-9/11 concerns with national 
security, and consider a more holistic, development-oriented vision.
RETHINKING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITIES
As we have seen, there is much talk about global governance set within assumptions 
of consensus, transparency and common vision. This universalist globalism 
is present in much of the discussion of the avian influenza response, yet often 
excludes difficult politics and competing interests, resulting in a rather anodyne 
version, largely unreflective of wider political processes. This global governance 
vision is enacted through grand mission statements and the instruments of 
multilateralism, but often comes unstuck when such perspectives are not in the 
interests of particular powerful worlds. Whether we live in a uni-polar world, one of 
new empires (Hardt and Negri 2000), a multi-polar one of diverse emergent powers 
(Huntington 1999), or a non-polar world where no-one has much influence anymore 
(Haass 2008) is a matter for much debate, and one that matters for how global 
responses to emerging threats such as new diseases are constructed. Assuming 
simple, universal, global consensus will get us nowhere, as policy regimes and 
instruments become either captured or obstructed. Thus, at the centre of any 
debate about ways forward, must be a searching – and politically-informed – look 
at the new configuration of power and interests globally, and the way that this 
affects our understandings of governance. 
Questions of who is accountable for what and to whom have been raised 
throughout this paper. This has often not been clear in the international response 
to date. Financial accountability has been assured through the regular reporting 
and monitoring by the World Bank, in relation to World Bank managed trust funds. 
UNSIC too has provided rigour, but the reporting and accountability relations to 
other organisations has often not been clear. And within agencies, systems exist 
for managing funds, controlling programmes and defining what is done too. But 
nearly all the accountability mechanisms identified refer to aid funds, and financial 
accounting systems. This is clearly important, given the huge amounts of money 
being spent, and such systems of upward accountability to donors has ensured 
that money has been accurately accounted for. But this misses out on other forms 
of auditing – both horizontal across organisations and downward to those people 
who the effort is supposed to be serving. In an international response with so many 
strands, this may be a tall order, but if ‘global’ only means accountability upwards 
to international donors, it then is little surprise that the effort becomes framed in 
7372
these terms. Getting a wider stakeholder group involved, beyond the formulaic and 
ritualised efforts of international ministerial meetings, must be a key challenge for 
any future efforts.  
NEW ORGANISATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
Sections 8 and 10 highlighted how developing organisational arrangements - and 
disciplinary, bureaucratic and other procedures - that can embrace surprise, deal 
with uncertainty and accept ignorance, as well as being more inclusive of diverse 
sources of knowledge and innovation, are essential. With the challenges stretching 
across ecosystem management, veterinary/animal production issues and human 
health and disease, some quite radical new configurations and incentive systems 
(if not organisations) will be required. For the UN, and international public system 
more generally, this will be a challenge. UN reform has been highlighted as an 
urgent requirement for decades. But perhaps this will be an important opportunity, 
revisiting mandates and capacities and revitalising the core UN agencies at the 
centre of any international disease response in ways that do not entrench existing 
interests, but allow more cross-agency working, flexibility and responsiveness. 
The avian influenza response has demonstrated some important successes in 
this regard, and the coordinating group, UNSIC, has in many respects offered an 
exemplary light-touch approach to facilitation, coordination and profile/fund raising 
across – and outside – the UN system. Caveats of course apply, and the danger of 
‘mission creep’ and ‘institutional fossilisation’ are always present, but the metaphor 
of a ‘movement’, an alliance of creative and like-minded people pushing an agenda 
is one that perhaps should be maintained.  
DISCIPLINARY AND PROFESSIONAL MIXES
As we have seen, the core international response has been dominated by a relatively 
narrow disciplinary and professional group – mostly vets and medics, and a few 
communications specialists. There have been others too of course, but largely on 
the margins. This has been seen as a fairly technical problem requiring a technical 
solution, and one framed by an ‘outbreak narrative’, where a disciplinary focus 
on ‘contamination’ (and eradication) trumps other ‘configurational’ perspectives, 
where livelihood contexts, dynamic ecologies and political economy become more 
important. The work by technical specialists focusing on the outbreak is clearly 
vital, and particularly revealing as understanding of molecular composition and 
genome dynamics increases173. But, as previous parts of this report have shown, 
these perspectives may narrow the analysis, and so constrain prognoses and 
recommendations. We would argue that the issues highlighted above – and widely 
recognised as important by nearly every informant we discussed with – require 
broader disciplinary and professional frames, and particularly more emphasis on 
173 See, for example, Hatta et al (2001); Lee et al (2004). 
the social sciences as a route to understanding the contextual factors that influence 
disease dynamics and the effectiveness of different types of response. It was a 
surprise to us that, within the core agencies involved in the international response, 
there seemed to be such a limited array of expertise (and this is not just special 
pleading from authors who trained as an ecologist and psychologist and work 
on the social science of science-policy interactions!) But beyond extending the 
contributions of formal expertise, we would argue that another important challenge 
will be to democratise expertise, and extend the contributions of others, beyond the 
professions and outside the technical agencies and the academe, to people who are 
living with and managing diseases on a day-to-day basis. Exposing scientific and 
policy claims to a wide range of critique from diverse sources enhances scientific 
rigour and policy robustness. For, it is the strategies and cultural logics of people 
in disease-affected areas which must, in the end, ensure that disease control is 
effective. This will require a substantial shift in professional and organisational 
cultures, as current approaches often actively exclude and often dismiss such 
alternative forms of knowledge and expertise.  
IMPROVING PROGRAMME DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
As discussed in the rest of the paper, there have been many good investments 
as part of the international avian influenza response, with long term capacities 
improved in a range of areas, and with emergency preparedness, at least in 
some quarters, substantially enhanced. However, all admit there have also been 
gaps and inadequacies. There are also questions of opportunity costs: could 
the money have been spent on something else? Are there other more pressing 
priorities that have missed out? The country studies that are being conducted as 
part of the wider study174 are revealing the complexity of programme design and 
implementation in particular places in South East Asia, as well as the wider politics 
of resource allocation at a national level. Bigger questions are being raised about 
aid effectiveness in areas where there is weak state capacity and high levels of 
corruption. Competition over aid resources can create highly distorting effects, 
and the desired cooperation and collaboration across government departments, 
the private sector, NGOs and civil society simply does not happen. Despite the 
increasing coherence and integration at the international level, at the country level 
barriers and divides generally remain as present as ever. The traditional vertical 
programme approach for sectoral interventions remains the preferred model. 
This attracts resources, and may generate rents. A cross-sectoral or sector-wide 
approach has proved less enticing, and much of the effort on the ground has 
remained fragmented and duplicative. For this reason, a more targeted approach 
to programming is needed, taking in a cross-sectoral approach and attuned to 
local circumstance and particular local political and policy contexts. There has 
been a tendency for a one-size-fits-all approach, where global expertise defines 
strategies towards disease control or public education and communication. These 
174 See www.steps-centre.org/ourresearch/avianflu.html.
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simple approaches have often not worked well, and have to be adapted in ad hoc 
ways. Making a feature of an adaptive and responsive approach up-front makes 
more sense. This accepts the principles of subsidiarity, decentralised control in 
design and implementation to the lowest level appropriate. This encourages a 
more participative approach to programme design, avoiding the worst problems of 
a technical, top-down, vertical programming approach. 
ASSESSING SUCCESS AND IMPACT
Central to any endeavour is having a vision of success – and with this some 
indicators of impact. Such visions and indicators of course follow on directly from 
the narratives at the centre of any policy response. Thus for the outbreak narratives 
that dominate the international avian influenza response, the vision is firmly one 
which centres on disease control, eradication, the prevention of avian outbreaks 
and so the prevention of a human pandemic. Indicators follow, focused on disease 
events and incidence. But such a narrative of course, as discussed, misses out 
on other alternative perspectives, focused on complex disease dynamics, poverty 
impacts, equity and access. These suggest very different indicators and measures 
of success or impact. In sum, there is very little clarity about what success is 
(beyond the obvious need to avoid a major human pandemic), and in practice 
success is often measured in terms of financial disbursement and completion of 
project activities. We suggest that there is an urgent need for a more thorough and 
on-going debate about ‘theories of change’ (or narratives in the language of this 
report) and indicators that are meaningful. 
As an outline for an agenda for action for the One World, One Health initiative, 
Table 1 provides a summary of the above discussion, highlighting ten areas for 
action which, we suggest, need to be addressed if the initiative is to really improve 
the world’s ability to respond to future, uncertain zoonotic disease threats in ways 
that are effective, equitable and resilient.
THEME FOCUS FOR THE HPAI 
RESPONSE
CHALLENGES FOR THE ONE 
WORLD, ONE HEALTH AGENDA
Outbreaks and 
endemism
Outbreak: disease events 
and diseased areas
More emphasis on dynamic drivers for 
 emerging diseases and endemic contexts
Risk and 
uncertainty
Risk – and risk 
management
The implications of uncertainty, 
ignorance and ambiguity need attention
Surveillance 
and information
Disease incidence and 
outbreak tracking
More focus on underlying dynamics of 
change, across a range of factors to identify 
 likely ‘hot spots’ and emergent diseases
Ethics, equity 
and access
Ethical, distributional and 
access issues not central
Questions of equity and who gets access 
 vital, asking whose world, whose health?
Health security A protectionist, national security stance
A more inclusive, rights-based human 
security vision
Global 
governance 
and 
accountabilities
A universalist, consensual 
globalism, with upward 
accountabilities to donors 
(largely)
A more politically realistic perspective 
on governance, recognising different 
interests and agendas, alongside a more 
 inclusive form of downward accountability
Organisational 
arrangements
Lead technical agencies 
with defined mandates, 
backed up with an efficient 
funding mechanism and 
light-touch coordination
Building on the model, aiming for 
‘optimal redundancy’ without too much 
overlap and avoiding forced integration, 
but maintaining a nimble, flexible 
coordination ‘movement’
Disciplines and 
professions
Veterinary and health 
professionals dominate
Need for more ecologists, 
epidemiologists, economists and social 
scientists, including anthropologists, 
sociologists and political scientists. And 
‘non-professionalised’ local experts
Programme 
design and 
implementation
Standard designs and 
blueprints based on core 
narratives, with local ad hoc 
adaptation in the field
Accepting flexible design and 
adaptation from the start, based on the 
principles of subsidiarity and participation
Success and 
impact
Success and impact 
indicators based on core 
narratives (theories of 
change). In practice, mostly 
focused on activities and 
disbursement
Widening the scope requires widening 
the visions of success, leading to a 
need to invest effort in defining, in an 
inclusive way, success and impact 
indicators more imaginatively
Table 1. Ten lessons from the international avian influenza response: challenges 
for the One World, One Health agenda
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Appendix 1: Avian influenza timelines – biology and policy, 1997-2007175
DISEASE BIOLOGY POLICY RESPONSES
1997
May – December
u H5N1 avian flu infects 18 people in Hong 
Kong, and six die.
u Hong Kong’s entire chicken population is 
slaughtered.
2003
February
u H5N1 reappears in Hong Kong. 
u H7N7 virus causes outbreak in chickens 
in The Netherlands.
December
u South Korea has its first outbreak of 
avian influenza in chickens, caused by H5N1.
2004
January
u Japan has H5N1outbreak in chickens. 
u Vietnam’s first human H5N1 cases.
February
u Indonesia first reports H5N1 in poultry in 
11 provinces. Vaccination is allowed.
April
u Avian influenza virus H7N3 confirmed in 
two poultry workers in British Columbia.
August
u In Vietnam and Thailand, H5N1 has 
infected at least 37 people, with 26 deaths.
September
u A mother who died after caring for her 
sick daughter is the first suspected case 
of person-to-person transmission of H5N1 
avian flu in Thailand.
February
u United Nations FAO advises 
governments in affected areas that mass 
culling of birds is failing to halt the disease 
and that vaccination of targeted poultry 
flocks is required as well.
May
u FAO and OIE sign The Global 
Framework of the Progressive Control of 
Transboundary Animal Diseases.
November
u WHO warns that the H5N1 bird flu virus 
might spark a flu pandemic that could kill 
millions of people, and is concerned that “much 
of the world is unprepared for a pandemic”.
u WHO officials meet with vaccine makers, 
public-health experts and government 
representatives in a bid to speed up the 
production of flu vaccines to avert a global 
pandemic
2005
January
u Rising numbers of cases in Vietnam and 
Thailand.
March
u WHO releases its preparedness plan for 
the control of an influenza pandemic at the 
national level.
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February
u First report of a human bird flu case in 
Cambodia.  
u Probable person to person transmission 
of bird flu in Vietnam is reported.
May
u Rumours of human deaths in China 
from H5N1 remain unconfirmed. 
u WHO reports 97 cases and 53 deaths 
from bird flu in Vietnam, Cambodia and 
Thailand since January 2004. 
June
u A farmer becomes Indonesia’s first 
human case of avian flu caused by the 
H5N1 virus. 
July
u The Philippines, so far the only Asian 
country unaffected by bird flu, report their 
first case in a town north of the capital, 
Manila, but do not confirm whether it is the 
H5N1 strain. 
October
u Thailand’s first human H5N1 case since 
October 2004.
u Indonesia has so far had seven 
confirmed and two probable human cases 
of H5N1 avian flu, with an additional 80 or 
so cases suspected. 
November
u China confirms three human cases of 
bird flu and investigates the possibility of 
human-to-human transmission. 
u A newly confirmed fatal case in Viet 
Nam coincides with a recurrence of 
outbreaks in poultry. Viet Nam has 
reported 66 cases (22 fatal) since 
December 2004.
December
u Newly confirmed human cases of H5N1 
avian flu bring the total number in Indonesia 
to 16. Of these cases, 11 were fatal.
u The EC and WHO organise a meeting in 
Luxembourg with representatives from the 
52 countries of the WHO European Region.
May
u FAO, OIE and WHO publish ‘A Global 
Strategy for the Progressive Control of 
Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza’.
July
u At the end of a three-day conference in 
Malaysia, WHO officials announce that 
$150 million is needed to fight the spread 
of the disease in people and another $100 
million to stop its spread in animals in Asia. 
August
u WHO recommends that regional offices 
stockpile drugs against bird flu: a 5-day 
course of Oseltamivir (Tamiflu) for 30% of 
workers and their families. 
September
u President Bush calls for an international 
partnership that would require countries 
facing an influenza outbreak to share 
information and samples with the WHO. 
October
u The  Government of Canada hosts 
an international meeting of Health 
Ministers to enhance global planning and 
collaboration on pandemic influenza. 
Delegations from 30 countries and 
representatives from nine international 
organizations attend.
u WHO reiterates that the level of 
pandemic alert remains unchanged at 
phase 3: a virus new to humans is causing 
infections, but does not spread easily from 
one person to another.
November
u President Bush announces that he 
will bid for $7.1 billion in emergency 
funding from US Congress to prepare for 
a possible bird flu pandemic, including 
purchasing of vaccines and drugs, 
development of new technology, and 
overseas aid.
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2005
November
u WHO, FAO, OIE and the World Bank 
co-sponsor a meeting on avian and human 
pandemic influenza at WHO headquarters, 
Geneva.
2006
January
u First reports of human H5N1 cases in 
Iraq and Turkey - confirmation that H5N1 
has moved beyond Asia.
March
u The first human cases of H5N1 avian 
flu occur in Egypt and Azerbaijan. In 
Azerbaijan, six cases appear to be due to 
contact with wild birds. The virus appears 
to be a distinct lineage to that currently 
circulating in east Asia.
April
u China has now reported 16 human cases 
of H5N1 infection, 11 of them fatal.
May
u First human case of H5N1 avian flu in Djibouti.
u A cluster of cases occur in Indonesia, 
killing seven of eight infected people, and 
is the first in which the WHO admits that 
human-to-human transmission is the most 
likely cause of spread.
June
u Hungary reports its first H5N1 in poultry 
(previously reported in wild birds).
u Ukraine reports H5N1 in poultry (first 
report since February 2006), first reported 
in wild birds in May 2006.
u Spain first reports H5N1 in a single wild 
shore bird in northern region.
August
u Viet Nam reports H5N1 in unvaccinated 
duck flocks and market ducks on routine 
surveillance. Ducks did not show clinical 
signs. (First report since December 2005).
January
u At the International Pledging Conference 
in Beijing, co-hosted by the Chinese 
government, the EC and the World 
Bank, donor countries and international 
health organizations pledge $1.9 billion 
to fight avian influenza and prepare for a 
pandemic. 
u Japan-WHO joint meeting  on early 
response to Potential Influenza Pandemic.
March
u WHO releases a draft containment plan 
containing guidelines for national authorities, 
as well as for launching a full-blown efforts 
including quarantine, closing of schools, 
churches, public transport and borders, and 
the large-scale distribution of antivirals.
April
u OFFLU, the network on avian influenza 
of the OIE FAO, agrees to make public 
material on outbreaks in animals.
June
u Vienna Senior Officials meeting on Avian 
and Human Pandemic Influenza organized 
by the Austrian Presidency of the EU, in 
coordination with the Commission, the 
USA and China.
July
u At the G8 summit in St. Petersberg, 
Russia, rich countries call for improved 
infectious disease surveillance through: 
“better coordination between the animal 
and human health communities, building 
laboratory capacities, and full transparency 
by all nations in sharing, on a timely basis, 
virus samples.”
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September
u Thailand confirms its 25th human case, 
in a 59-year-old man from Nong Bua Lam 
Phu Province in Northeastern Thailand 
(onset date 14 July 2006).
November
u Republic of Korea reports H5N1 in 
poultry (first since September 2004). 
Outbreaks continue to be reported.
u Indonesia confirms its 73rd human case 
in a 35-year-old woman from Banten and 
its 74th human case, in a 30 month old 
boy from West Java.
December
u Egypt confirms its 16th, 17th, and 18th 
human cases in an extended family in 
Gharbiyah.
August
u The Indonesian government and the 
US Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention announce that they will share 
all flu data.
u Leading flu researchers sign up 
to the Global Initiative on Sharing 
Avian Influenza Data (GISAID) under 
which countries and scientists agree 
to immediately share pre-publication 
samples and data.
October
u The WHO calls for a boost in influenza 
vaccine manufacturing capacity and use 
of new technologies to produce more potent 
and effective vaccines, as outlined in new 
guidelines: The global pandemic Influenza 
action plan to increase vaccine supply.
u New FAO Crisis Management Centre 
(CMC) inaugurated to fight Avian 
Influenza outbreaks and other major 
animal health or food health-related 
emergencies.
December
u US$475 million pledged at the end of 
a major three-day international inter-
ministerial conference in Bamako, Mali.
2007
February
u Lao PDR reports its first human case of 
H5N1 avian flu, and the second in March.
March
u According to the WHO, the total number 
of H5N1 cases since the initial south east 
Asia outbreaks in 2003 has reached 281, 
with 169 deaths. Indonesia, currently the 
only country to report cases in 2007, has 
had a total of 81 confirmed human cases, 
63 of which were fatal. Vietnam, which saw 
the highest country incidence of 93 cases 
(42 deaths) up to 2005, has reported no 
new human cases for over a year.
March
u The US government approves Sanofi-
Pasteur’s vaccine against H5N1 bird flu, 
even though it is only partially effective.
The US Food and Drug Administration 
releases its Influenza Pandemic 
Preparedness Plan.
April
u WHO awards grants to 6 developing 
countries to produce influenza vaccines. 
The awards will fund the establishment of 
facilities to manufacture routine seasonal flu 
vaccines which can then be used to produce 
avian flu vaccines if a pandemic occurs.
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2007
March
u Bangladesh first reports H5N1 in poultry.
April
u Egypt continues to have the highest 
number of infections and fatalities from 
avian flu outside Asia, with 34 cases, and 
14 deaths.
June
u Indonesia reports its 101st case of avian 
flu.
September
u Number of human cases of H5N1 avian 
flu rises to 200 globally.
November
u UK reports H5N1 in a flock of free-range 
turkeys in England (first since January 
2007).
December
u Poland reports H5N1 in young turkeys in 
Mazowieckie (first outbreak ever in poultry, 
last H5N1 report in a wild swan in May 
2006).
u Egypt retrospectively reports 579 
outbreaks of H5N1 in birds from 23 March 
2006 through 24 November 2007.
u Pakistan informs WHO of 8 people in the 
North West Frontier Province that have 
tested positive for H5N1. These are the 
first suspected human cases ever reported 
in Pakistan.
May
u WHO approves a resolution to stockpile 
vacccines for H5N1 and other influenza 
viruses of pandemic potential and to 
establish guidelines for their fair and 
equitable distribution at affordable prices. 
The resolution also calls for new terms of 
reference for the sharing of flu viruses by 
WHO collaborating centres and reference 
laboratories.
June
u WHO’s International Health Regulations 
take effect from 15 June. Member states 
are now legally obliged to respond and 
provide technical assistance for the 
containing, at source, any health threat 
of international concern, with emphasis 
on smallpox, polio, SARS, and novel flu 
strains, including H5N1.
u Rome - International Technical Meeting 
on Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza and 
Human H5N1 Infection.
December
u The New Delhi International Ministerial 
Conference on Avian Influenza proposes 
‘One Word One Health’ theme. 
175 This appendix has been compiled from timelines, chronologies and new reports from the 
following sources:
EC: http://ec.europa.eu/food/animal/diseases/controlmeasures/avian/h5n1_chronology_en.htm
FAO: http://www.fao.org/avianflu/en/index.html
Nature: http://www.nature.com/nature/focus/avianflu/timeline.html
WHO: http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/ai_timeline/en/index.html
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